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Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the
Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the
Practice of Law
Mark K. Osbeck*
ABSTRACT
Outcome prediction has always been an important part of practicing
law. Clients rely heavily on their attorneys to provide accurate
assessments of the potential legal consequences they face when making
important decisions (such as whether to accept a plea bargain, or risk a
conviction on a much more serious offense at trial). And yet,
notwithstanding its enormous importance to the practice of law (and
notwithstanding the handsome legal fees it commands), outcome
prediction in the law remains a very imprecise endeavor.
The reason for this inaccuracy is that the three principal tools
lawyers have traditionally relied on to facilitate outcome predictions—
legal analysis, lawyerly experience, and the use of certain types of
empirical information (e.g., jury verdict reporters)—are all subject to
significant problems and limitations. This article examines in detail the
reasons for these problems and limitations, concluding that they are
essentially intractable. Thus, there is little hope that the traditional tools
of outcome prediction on their own can ever enable consistently accurate
assessments of potential legal outcomes.
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science offer some
grounds for optimism. Already, these advances are beginning to alter the
way law firms operate, and there are good reasons to believe that data
science (or more specifically, predictive analytics) will soon enable more
accurate outcome predictions as well. Of course, predictive analytics is
not a panacea: significant challenges remain if it is going to enable
accurate outcome predictions on its own. And so it is doubtful that
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predictive analytics will supplant the traditional tools of outcome
prediction in the foreseeable future. Rather, predictive analytics is likely
to complement the traditional tools in order to power more accurate
outcome predictions. However, even that modest change is likely to have
a significant effect on the way lawyers practice law, and it should also
come as very welcome news to their clients.
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INTRODUCTION

The practice of law requires lawyers to assume various roles.1 The
most celebrated of these roles is lawyer as advocate: where is, the lawyer
stands in the client’s stead, promoting the client’s interests.2 Less
celebrated, but equally important, is the role of the lawyer as advisor.3 In
this role, “a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in
determining the course of future conduct and relationships.”4 One of the
most important tasks lawyers undertake in furtherance of this advisory
role is outcome prediction: that is, advising the client as to the likely
outcome of various legal proceedings.5 In undertaking this vital task, the
lawyer is required to analyze the various options and advise the client
regarding the likely outcome of each so that the client can make an
informed decision.6
Outcome prediction, therefore, is an essential lawyering skill.
Lawyers, particularly litigators, cannot provide effective counsel to
clients if they cannot accurately assess the potential outcomes of
1. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)
(“In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles
that require the performance of many difficult tasks.”).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rs. 3.1–3.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(discussing professional responsibilities attendant to the lawyer’s role as advocate).
3. Id. at rs. 2.1–2.4 (discussing professional responsibilities attendant to the
lawyer’s role as advisor). See also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 17 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2008) (noting that when acting as business counsel, “the lawyer is
interested . . . in anticipating what the court might do and in shaping his client’s conduct
to his client’s desires in view of that anticipation.”).
4. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3.
5. Id. at EC 7-5 (“A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving
his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of
the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such
decision.”).
6. Id. at EC 7-8 (“A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each
legal alternative.”).
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litigation and other legal matters and advise their clients accordingly.7
Outcome prediction is basically the legal equivalent of prognosis in
medicine: an attempt to forecast the consequences of various courses of
action so that the lawyer can help the client make informed decisions
about matters of significant consequence to the client. It pervades the
practice of law,8 just as it does the practice of medicine. Every time a
criminal defense attorney advises a client whether to accept a plea
agreement; every time a civil litigator advises a prospective plaintiff
whether to initiate a lawsuit, or to settle a lawsuit; every time a tax
lawyer advises a client whether to take an aggressive deduction on the
client’s return—in all of these circumstances and many more, the lawyer
is called upon to serve as a prognosticator as part of the lawyer’s role as
advisor.
Yet in spite of the enormous importance of outcome prediction to
the practice of law, the academic legal literature is lacking any
thoroughgoing analysis of how outcome prediction in the law actually
works, and how it might be improved upon.9 What literature there is
concerning outcome prediction in the law has mainly been generated by
scholars in cognate disciplines, such as artificial intelligence and political
science, and it is primarily concerned with generating predictive
models.10 What remains wanting is a thorough understanding of the
actual tools lawyers use to formulate outcome predictions and a critical
assessment of their effectiveness.

7. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457
(1897) (arguing that law is a profession precisely because people are willing to pay
lawyers to advocate on their behalf and to advise them as to possible legal consequences
they may face).
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5.
9. This lack of attention in the literature may well be because, to put it simply,
predictions are difficult, and lawyers have traditionally been less than stellar at making
outcome predictions. See NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND
OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 184 (6th ed. 2014) (“[T]rying to predict what parties,
witnesses, judges, and juries are likely to do is often little more than an educated guessing
game.”); see also infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV.
455 (1949); Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A
Quantitative Analysis of the “Right to Counsel” Cases, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1957);
Glendon Schubert, A Psychometric Model of the Supreme Court, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST,
Nov. 1961, at 14; Franklin M. Fisher, The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321
(1958).
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This Article attempts to fill the void in the legal academic literature
concerning outcome prediction. It does so by first examining how
outcome prediction has traditionally functioned in the practice of law,
whereby lawyers have relied on three principal tools: (1) legal analysis
(of a particular sort this article refers to as “element-focused analysis”);
(2) lawyerly experience; and (3) the use of certain types of empirical
information.11 The Article then evaluates critically the effectiveness of
these traditional tools, focusing on a variety of issues that impede
accurate predictions.12 The Article gives particular attention to problems
that inherently afflict the “element-focused analysis” that lawyers have
long relied upon to inform outcome predictions, as this topic has received
almost no attention in the scholarly literature.13 Lastly, the Article
discusses how outcome prediction in the practice of law might be
improved upon going forward, thanks to recent advances in data
science.14 It concludes that while the traditional tools that lawyers use to
make outcome predictions (particularly the element-focused analysis)
have a number of shortcomings that lead to significant inaccuracy, the
new tools that rely upon predictive analytics offer a glimmer of hope that
lawyers going forward will be better at making outcome predictions than
they traditionally have been.15
Part II of this Article discusses in detail the reasons why outcome
prediction is a vital part of practicing law. Part III looks at the tools
lawyers have traditionally used to make outcome predictions. It examines
in detail each of the three principal tools and the ways in which lawyers
use them in practice. Part IV examines the problems and limitations that
afflict the traditional tools of outcome prediction, again with a particular
focus on the element-focused analysis that has traditionally played a vital
role in outcome prediction, but which is largely ignored in the literature.
And finally, Part V of this Article discusses the prospects going forward
for employing predictive analytics to help lawyers make more accurate
outcome predictions.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTCOME PREDICTION TO THE PRACTICE OF
LAW

The legal profession is not unique in its need for accurate outcome
predictions. In a number of professional fields, practitioners need to be
able to assess the likelihood of potential outcomes. In the field of
medicine, for example, doctors need to make prognoses to properly
assess treatment options; in the field of investment advising,
stockbrokers strive to provide their clients an accurate assessment of a
stock’s likely prospects in the market; and in the field of sports,
prognosticators are valued not only for the assistance they can provide
gamblers but also for such things as evaluating the potential success of
prospective players.
In the practice of law, lawyers need to assess the likely outcome of
litigation matters for several important reasons. First, the decision
whether to originate a litigation matter requires a reasonable balancing of
costs versus expected benefits, and a significant component of this
calculation is an estimation of the client’s likelihood of success. Second,
deciding whether to accept a settlement offer, whether in the criminal or
civil context, depends upon a reasonable assessment of the likely
outcome in the absence of a settlement. And third, outside of a litigation
context, transactional lawyers often need to assess the likely outcomes of
the various decisions confronting their business clients (for example, the
prospects of litigation arising from a proposed business decision), and
this too requires a reasonable prediction as to what is likely to happen if
the client proceeds in a certain manner. For each of these reasons, as well
as some other more minor reasons, outcome prediction forms an
important part of a lawyer’s role when the lawyer acts as an advisor
rather than an advocate.16
A.

The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Case Selection

First, outcome prediction is vital to efficient case selection. When a
civil litigator or prosecutor is evaluating whether to initiate an action, the

16. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – Or – How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 912 (2013) (“[P]rediction is a core component of the
guidance that many lawyers offer. Indeed, it is by generating informed answers to these
types of questions that many lawyers earn their respective wages.”).
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lawyer needs to first assess the merits of the prospective case,17 which in
turn requires the lawyer to evaluate the likelihood of success.18
The lawyer has an ethical obligation not to pursue a spurious
action19 (or, in the case of a prosecutor, to refrain from prosecuting an
action the lawyer knows is unsupported by probable cause20), and this
requires an assessment as to the likelihood of winning. If there is little or
no chance of success, then the lawyer needs to evaluate the lawyer’s
ethical obligations carefully.
However, even assuming these ethical obligations are satisfied, the
lawyer must still make an outcome prediction to properly assess the case.
First, the lawyer has a fiduciary obligation to act in accordance with the
client’s interests,21 and this requires (among other things) a risk-benefit
analysis balancing the costs of litigation against the possible recovery.22
Second, from the perspective of the lawyer’s own pecuniary
interests, outcome prediction is often important in determining whether
the action is worth pursuing from the point of view of the lawyer or the
lawyer’s firm, particularly in contingency citations, when the lawyer has
a stake in the litigation.23 If, for example, a plaintiff’s lawyer
overestimates either the likelihood of success or the likely amount of the
recovery, the client is not going to be happy with the result because the
recovery is less than expected, and the lawyer’s law firm will also be
unhappy, if the firm has a contingent interest in the litigation and the
ultimate recovery does not justify the firm’s expenditure on the matter.

17. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Kline, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984); see also THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL
86–91 (9th ed. 2015).
18. See Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Cloudy Forecasts, TRIAL, Apr. 2011, at
28, 29 (“When evaluating a case’s potential, the lawyer weighs the costs and benefits
based upon an educated guess as to the case’s outcome.”).
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
20. Id. at r. 3.8.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 49–50 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
22. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big
Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1370–71 (2015) (describing research indicating that lawyers
undertake this type of analysis in assessing the validity of prospective actions); see also
Greene & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 29.
23. In a contingency action, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s fee is dependent on the recovery.
Typically, such lawyers get a percentage of the final recovery (capped by state rules),
with the percentage amount depending on whether and when the matter is settled, or
whether it proceeds to trial and/or appeal. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 97–
99.
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Likewise, if a prosecutor overestimates the likelihood of success on a
criminal action, this increases the risk of an acquittal that might
otherwise have resulted in a plea bargain. And even if a plea is ultimately
entered, the costs required to obtain that plea will likely exceed what
they would have been had the prosecution made a more reasonable offer
early in the litigation process.
Thus, in both the civil and criminal contexts, outcome prediction is
an important part of the initial case assessment that takes place before an
action is originated.
B.

The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Making Settlement
Decisions

Outcome prediction is perhaps even more important in the context
of settlement negotiations, given that a critical component of rational
negotiation is a reasonable assessment of the likely outcome of the case
in the absence of a negotiated settlement agreement.24 Imagine, for
example, that you come home from work one night and waiting for you
in the shadows are several police officers. They arrest you, charge you
with a crime, and cart you off to jail. Hopefully, you are able to obtain
bail and gain your release. And now it’s time to begin working on your
defense. At that point, you earnestly want a lawyer to assist you.
So, what would you look for in that lawyer? You might be inclined
to look for a Perry Mason type—a brilliant trial lawyer who could prove
your innocence at trial.25 However, that may not be your wisest option.
For in the vast majority of both criminal and civil cases, the outcome is
determined not through jury trials, but rather through negotiation and
plea bargaining.26 And so you would probably be better served by

24. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 135, 136–37 (1993) (describing the generally
accepted model of settlement, whereby cases that fail to settle are those in which the
plaintiff overstates and/or the defendant underestimates the expected value of going to
trial).
25. Perry Mason is a fictional American trial lawyer. He was the main character in
numerous novels written by Erle Gardner. The character was also portrayed by actor
Raymond Burr in a popular television series that originally ran from 1957–1966. See
Perry Mason, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/topic/Perry-Mason (last
visited July 30, 2018).
26. Laura A. Kaster, Cognitive Barriers to Valuing Your Case for Settlement or
Mediation: Improving Your Risk Assessment, 269 N.J. LAW. 43, 43 (noting that “[o]ver
95% of litigated cases are settled.”).
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focusing on a lawyer who was skilled at negotiation and at providing you
with sage advice as to the desirability of accepting whatever plea bargain
that the prosecution may ultimately offer.27
In order to provide such counsel, your lawyer will have to properly
assess your case, which involves a risk-benefit analysis. Specifically,
your lawyer must balance the prospect of a sure adverse result (e.g., a
one-year prison term) against a potentially worse adverse result (e.g., a
20-year prison term), if your defense fails at trial, and you are
convicted.28 And that, in turn, requires your lawyer to forecast both the
likelihood of losing at trial, should you reject the prosecutor’s plea
bargain, and the length of the sentence you are likely to receive if you are
convicted at trial.29
Reasonable outcome prediction is also essential to making wise
decisions regarding settlement prospects in the civil context. In order to
provide sage counsel as to the desirability of accepting any given
settlement offer, a lawyer must be able to properly assess the odds of
winning at trial and the potential ramifications of losing at trial.30
Suppose, for example, that the lawyer is defending a company in a
breach of contract action. The plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in damages for
the breach, and the defendant has made an offer of $100,000. In that
situation, whether the $100,000 settlement offer is reasonable (from the
defendant’s perspective) depends, at least as a starting point, upon the
likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict, the likely amount of any verdict, and
the anticipated costs (primarily attorney’s fees) of proceeding to trial.31
27. These two skills, however, are interrelated. A lawyer with a widespread
reputation for strong trial skills is likely to have an advantage in terms of settlement clout
over a less skilled trial lawyer because opposing counsel will be less inclined to take their
chances at trial against a skilled trial lawyer.
28. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2496–527 (2004).
29. See Holmes, supra note 7, at 457 (“People want to know under what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is
to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of
the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”).
30. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968, 997 (1979); see also Stevenson &
Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1375–77.
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); see also Mnookin & Kornhausert,
supra note 30, at 968.
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The more inaccurate the defendant’s assessment of the case, the more
money the defendant is likely to lose, either by paying too much in the
settlement, or by taking an unjustified risk at trial.32 And the same is true
of the plaintiff. The more inaccurate the plaintiff’s assessment, the less
the plaintiff is likely to recover, either by accepting too little in the
settlement, or by taking an unjustified risk at trial.33 So accurate outcome
prediction is essential to a lawyer’s ability to provide sound advice to the
client regarding settlement prospects.
Furthermore, the ability of lawyers to effectively advise clients as to
the likely outcome of litigation matters affects more than just individual
clients. For unless both lawyers in a litigation matter properly assess the
likelihood of a particular outcome, the efficiency of the settlement
process itself suffers. Presumably, the goal of settlement is to avoid

32. In mathematical terms, the settlement offer (“S”) is reasonable from the
defendant’s perspective if: S ≤ (P × V) + C (where “P” is the probability of a plaintiff’s
verdict, “V” is the likely size of the verdict, and “C” is the cost of proceeding to trial).
Thus, if the defense lawyer estimates the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict (P) at 15%,
the potential verdict amount (V) at $1 million, and the costs of additional litigation to trial
(C) at $25,000, then the $100,000 settlement amount is reasonable, given that the value of
(P × V) + C is $175,000 in that hypothetical. Conversely, if the plaintiff refuses to settle
the case for $175,000, then it would be prudent for the defendant to take its chances at
trial, assuming it isn’t risk averse for some other rational reason (e.g., the company is
uninsured and would be bankrupted by a $1 million verdict, but could absorb some lesser
amount, such as $200,000). See generally Priest & Kline, supra note 17, at 12–13;
MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 408–13 (discussing in depth this type of settlement
calculation). This formula is overly simplified, of course. There are other potential costs,
such as tax consequences, bad publicity, etc., that must be factored into the equation as
well. Furthermore, it may sometimes be reasonable for a defendant (or its insurer) to offer
less in settlement than the formula would indicate is reasonable, in hopes of deterring
future litigation. On the simple formula set out above, even if the likelihood of a
successful recovery is zero (because P is zero), it would still be rational for the defendant
to settle for an amount greater than zero but less than the cost of going to trial, which is
generally not insignificant. But if the defendant settles right away for nuisance value, as
the simple formula would prescribe, there is little to prevent unscrupulous plaintiffs from
filing frivolous lawsuits in hopes of scoring a quick settlement. The defendant has an
incentive to require the plaintiff to prove up its case, which helps to eliminate spurious
cases, and also requires the plaintiff to incur costs that would serve as a deterrent to filing
a lawsuit. The formula is also overly simplified with respect to determining the expected
value of V, the potential verdict. While this amount might be fairly definite in some types
of actions, such as breach of contract actions in which plaintiffs seeks a set amount, in
other types of actions, such as negligence actions, estimating the potential recovery is
more difficult. In those types of actions, there will a range of potential verdicts (e.g., the
defense lawyer may reasonably assess the expected verdict at anywhere from $100,000 to
$1 million). See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 408–09.
33. See Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 854 (2012).
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uncertainty and wasted resources (in addition to mental stress) by shortcircuiting the litigation process, so that roughly the same result is reached
in settlement that would have been reached at trial, without the negatives
of protracted litigation.34 However, if either or both lawyers have
unrealistic expectations of their client’s likelihood of success at trial,
then an efficient settlement won’t be reached.35 If, for example, the
plaintiff’s lawyer overestimates the likelihood of success, then some
cases that shouldn’t proceed to trial will; conversely, if the plaintiff’s
lawyer underestimates the likelihood of success and decides not to
pursue a meritorious action vigorously, then some deserving plaintiffs
will settle for less than fair compensation.36
Thus, the ability to make reasonably accurate predictions regarding
litigation outcomes is key to the efficiency of our litigation system as a
whole. And the same is true with respect to the efficiency of our criminal
justice system. If prosecutors make errant judgments about the likely
result of potential prosecutions, then the system will misallocate judicial
and prosecutorial resources, resulting in fewer convictions of those who
deserve to be convicted, and a greater waste of time and resources trying
to convict those who merit lesser plea bargains.
C.

The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Transactional Practice

While outcome prediction is most clearly at issue in litigation
matters, the importance of outcome prediction is not confined to
litigation. Transactional lawyers also need to assess potential outcomes
to properly counsel their clients. A tax attorney advising a client whether
to take a certain deduction, for example, must analyze both the likelihood

34. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 393 (“The law encourages settlement,
and clients often prefer settlement over the increased expenses and uncertainties of a
trial.”).
35. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 134 (2010) (“At the end of
the day, it is the accurate predictions of the lawyer that enable the justice system to
function smoothly . . . .”). A similar cost/benefit analysis is required for efficient
litigation strategy. To decide whether a particular motion is warranted, for example, or
whether it is worthwhile to pursue a certain type of evidence in support of a claim or
defense, requires a balancing of the costs versus the anticipated likelihood of success. See
Snyder, supra note 33, at 854.
36. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at 134–35; Kaster, supra note 26, at
43, 46.
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of an audit as well as the likely outcome should the IRS decide to pursue
an audit.
Often, potential litigation is an important contingency that
individuals and companies have to consider when they enter into
business transactions. If there is a possibility that the contemplated
transaction will involve litigation, then both the potential consequences
of that litigation and the expected costs of that litigation must be factored
into the cost-benefit analysis as the client determines whether to go
forward with the deal. And in order to properly assess the costs and
benefits of the prospective transaction, the transactional lawyer (often in
conjunction with a litigator) must make a prediction with respect to the
likely outcome of the potential litigation.37
Suppose, for example, a group of investors is considering
purchasing a tract of real estate in order to develop it into a private golf
and ski resort. The client is interested in investing tens of millions of
dollars to purchase a large tract of undeveloped land, which the client
thinks could ultimately be developed into parcels worth several hundred
million dollars in the aggregate. There is, however, one not-so-little
hitch: title to the land is in dispute, and that title is the subject of a
pending lawsuit. Both the client (i.e., the prospective buyer), and the
seller believe that the seller’s pending quiet-title action is likely to
succeed, and yet it is crucially important to get a sense of just how likely
the odds of success are, so that the client can make a rational decision
whether to invest in the property at all, and if so, how much to invest.
The difference between a 5 percent likelihood that the quiet title action
would fail versus a 20 percent likelihood that it would fail will make a
significant difference in the amount the client is willing to pay for the
property. In this type of situation, the transactional lawyer’s job is to
provide (probably in conjunction with firm’s litigation attorneys) the best
possible outcome prediction as to the quiet title action so that the client
can make an informed choice whether to proceed with the purchase.38
The transactional client’s decision whether to proceed with a deal,
and if so, how much to invest in it, may also hinge on outcome

37. See Peter A. Antonucci & Lianne S. Pinchuk, The Importance of Product
Liability Risk Assessment in Business Valuation and Acquisitions, THE METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 13, 2017, at 1 (arguing that transactional lawyers should
enlist experienced litigators in assessing product liability risks in connection with
business valuations and acquisitions).
38. See id.
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predictions regarding other types of proceedings, such as the prospects
for proposed legislation or regulatory action.39 For example, a company’s
decision whether to build a new plant in a particular location may hinge
in large part on a proposed regulation that affects potential liability for
environmental concerns. In that instance, the transactional lawyer may
turn to the firm’s regulatory lawyers for guidance as to the likely
prospects for agency approval.
There are other contingencies transactional lawyers need to consider
as well. They need to make predictions as to uncertainties, such as
whether necessary licenses and permits can be obtained, and if so, how
quickly; whether the U.S. Department of Justice will approve a proposed
merger; or whether adequate financing will be available to fund the
transaction. All of these require the transactional lawyer to engage in
some degree of prognostication.40
Thus, outcome prediction is a vital component of client counseling.
The client will have difficulty making important decisions unless the
client has confidence in the lawyer’s ability to make accurate outcome
predictions. While this article focuses mostly upon outcome prediction in
the context of litigation, the importance of outcome prediction is not
limited to that area of the law, and much of what is discussed below
applies in the transactional context as well.
III. THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF OUTCOME PREDICTION
The principal tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case
outcomes are: (1) an element-focused analysis of each asserted cause of
action and defense in the case, looking to prior decisional law to
determine whether these elements are met; (2) lawyerly experience; and
(3) certain types of empirical information that may provide insight into
how a prospective judge or jury would decide the instant matter. This
Part examines the nature of these tools, and Part IV examines their
shortcomings.

39. Electronic legal research providers are now providing tools to assist with this
type of outcome prediction (e.g., the LexisNexis Legislative Outlook tool). See Press
Release, LexisNexis Debuts Legislative Outlook and Moves Extensive News Archive to
Lexis Advance, LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2NYqq2q (last visited July 30, 2018).
40. See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS 3–4 (3d ed. 2011).
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The Element-Focused Analysis

The foundational tool lawyers have traditionally used to assess
cases, particularly in the early stages of a dispute, is an “element-focused
analysis” of the causes of action and defenses. In undertaking this type of
analysis, the lawyer anticipates the process the trier of fact will need to
follow in its assessment of the claim by analytically breaking down the
cause of action or defense into its constituent elements, then determining
for each element whether it applies in light of the known facts in order to
predict the likely outcome.41 Occasionally, courts will employ other
types of tests (e.g., a factor test42) in reaching their determinations, but
the most fundamental type of analysis in judicial decision-making
revolves around an analysis of the elements of the various causes-ofaction and defenses. The lawyer then goes through the same process with
respect to each potential defense. In other words, when assessing the
viability of a claim or potential claim, the lawyer examines, for each
cause of action that has or might be alleged, the various elements and
defenses that are applicable, and then makes a separate assessment as to
the viability of each such element or defense. The lawyer can then assess
the likely outcome of the cause of action overall, since (by definition) a
cause of action fails if any element is not met, or if any (complete)
defense applies.43
41. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342; see also RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR. ET AL., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 9–16 (8th ed. 2017)
[hereinafter NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING].
42. In an equitable matter, such as a child custody determination, for example, courts
balance various factors such as the parents’ employment status, or a parents’ drug/alcohol
abuse, in deciding what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child.
Presumably, however, judicial decisions involving such factor tests are even more
difficult to predict than those involving element focused analyses, since they involve a
complicated weighing and a balancing of the various factors to determine whether the
standard applies, and not just a “checking off” of those requirements that need to be met
to fall within the scope of a legal rule. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992); Kevin H. Smith, Practical
Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art and Science of Thinking Like a
Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 58–61 (1998) (discussing how standards operate in legal
analyses and arguing that legal standards are less constraining than rules).
43. See Smith, supra note 42, at 47–57 (discussing how elements operate in applying
legal rules to facts, and arguing that rules are essentially conditional (i.e., “if/then”
statements) comprised of triggering conditions in the form of elements); see also
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342 (“This application of law to facts would
yield an estimate about probabilities: that is, a prediction of the likelihood that a given
rule would govern a given scenario.”).
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Suppose, for example, that a potential client wants to bring a cause
of action for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
most states, a cause of action for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) requires the plaintiff to establish four elements:
(1) that the conduct was intentional or reckless, (2) that the behavior in
question caused the emotional distress, (3) that the defendant’s conduct
was “outrageous,” and (4) that the resulting emotional distress was
severe.44 The traditional element-focused analysis proceeds by evaluating
each of these elements in turn, trying to assess whether, in light of the
known facts, each one would be deemed applicable, were the court or
jury to evaluate the potential case. Then, having analyzed each element
(and any applicable defenses, such as the defense of privilege), the
lawyer tries to make a projection as to the likelihood of success of the
cause of action as a whole, based on the likelihood that each component
element is met.
In determining whether the elements of a cause of action are met,
the traditional analysis evaluates each element primarily in light of the
case precedents interpreting that element. 45 Thus, the traditional analysis
relies heavily upon legal research to find precedents that can be
compared and contrasted on their facts with the instant case to determine
whether the element is met.46 Suppose, for example, that the potential
defendant in our hypothetical IIED case is a teacher who yelled and
cursed at the potential plaintiff, who was a 12-year-old student. Does that
behavior constitute “outrageous conduct” for purposes of establishing the
third element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress? To
answer this question, the lawyer traditionally starts by researching case
law in the appropriate jurisdiction (or assigning the research to an
associate), looking for IIED cases that shed light on the meaning of
“outrageous conduct.”47
44. Most states follow the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST.
1965), which lays out these four elements of the tort.
45. The elements themselves may derive either from a textual source (e.g., a statute)
or from the common law (e.g., a cause of action in tort, such as IIED). See Smith, supra
note 42, at 49.
46. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–79 (1987)
(describing in depth how precedent functions at a theoretical level) [hereinafter Schauer,
Precedent]; see also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1371–72.
47. Case-law precedents are not the exclusive interpretive tools, however; other
interpretive aids, such as scholarly commentary, may also be used to shed light on the
meaning and applicability of the various elements. With respect to IIED, for example, the
comments and illustrations that accompany RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 are
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Having located relevant precedents on this issue, the lawyer then
looks at two things: (1) whether the courts promulgate any rules, factors,
or principles (explicit or implicit) that outline the boundaries of that
element (e.g., rules that define “outrageous conduct”); and (2) whether
the defendant’s behavior in the instant case is similar to the behavior of
the defendants in those cases in which courts have found the element to
be met.48
As regards the first criterion, the law in most states follows the
Restatement in requiring a very high threshold for outrageous conduct: it
must be conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”49 The second
criterion—factual similarity between the precedent case and the instant
case—is key for fleshing out the applicability of abstract rules, such as
the one quoted above. If the factual circumstances are sufficiently and
relevantly similar, then the lawyer concludes that the element of
outrageous conduct is likely satisfied, and will move on to the next
element; if the behavior is not on par, then the element is not met.50 Once
a determination is made with respect to each element, the cause of action
as a whole can be evaluated because a cause of action exists only if every
element is established.51
Of course, the degree of confidence the lawyer has in a particular
outcome prediction depends upon how confident the lawyer is with
respect to each element. While lawyers typically don’t assign
percentages to the individual elements (e.g., a 60 percent chance the jury
will find the element of causation is met), they do tend to qualify their
determinations broadly (e.g., it is “highly likely” or just “more likely
than not” that the jury will find the conduct to be outrageous).52 And this,
of course, affects their assessment of the cause of action as a whole.
Thus, if the lawyer feels that it is highly likely the jury will find each

generally considered important persuasive authorities for interpreting the elements set out
in the model rule.
48. See Smith, supra note 42, at 40–46 (discussing the synthesis of legal rules from
precedents and their application to facts).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
50. See Smith, supra note 42, at 45 (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis or precedent is
quite complex, but it can be reasonably captured by a single phrase: similar facts, same
law, same result.”).
51. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 121.
52. Id. at 164.
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element of IIED to be met, then the lawyer can be quite confident in
predicting that a cause of action for IIED will succeed.53 Conversely, if
the lawyer determines that it is just slightly more likely than not that one
or more of the elements is met, then the lawyer will make a less
confident prediction.
Research memoranda (a.k.a. “legal memoranda” or “formal office
memoranda”) have traditionally been the vehicles through which lawyers
record and convey their outcome predictions.54 Further, for many years,
researching and preparing such memoranda occupied the lion’s share of a
typical junior attorney’s time.55 Traditionally in these memoranda, the
lawyer started with a question presented and a short answer to the
question presented. This was followed by a summary of the facts, and
then a detailed element-by-element analysis of one or more causes of
action and/or defenses, followed by a brief conclusion that assessed the
viability of the overall action.56 Some experienced lawyers, however,
may prefer that the lawyer undertaking a research project confine the
scope of the memorandum to explaining the legal requirements for each
individual element or defense, leaving the overall analysis as to the
viability of the overall cause of action to the senior lawyer. Frequently,
the research memorandum will then form the basis for an advice letter to
the client, through which the senior lawyer can convey the results of the

53. But see infra Section IV.A.6.
54. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159 (“An office
memorandum predicts how the law will treat the client.”); JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 259–60 (4th ed. 2010);
EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 131 (“Making an accurate prediction, then, is the function of
an office memo.”).
55. Kirsten K. Davis, “The Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated”:
Reading and Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing Age, 92 OR. L.
REV. 471, 472–74, 482–83 (2013) (summarizing the traditional use of the office
memorandum and describing a survey of law school graduates and their continued use of
traditional legal memoranda, as well as more contemporary alternatives, such as short
email memos).
56. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. ET AL., LEGAL WRITING 123–26 (3d ed. 2015). Of
course, legal memoranda have other possible uses as well. For example, a legal
memorandum can be used merely to summarize the law on a particular topic, without
applying that law to the facts in question. Similarly, it can be used to merely make the
best arguments the clients can make in light of the law and the facts, without necessarily
trying to predict a likely outcome. However, the main use of a legal memorandum
traditionally has been to assess the client’s case and to predict the likely outcome.
NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159.
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element-focused analysis to the client, and advise the client
accordingly.57
Most often, this analysis takes place at the beginning of the
litigation process, where the lawyers for the parties are trying to ascertain
how they should respond to a potential litigation matter (e.g., whether to
file a claim if they represent the plaintiff, or whether to make an early
settlement offer if they represent the defendant).58 As discussed in Part II
above, the plaintiff’s lawyer needs to evaluate the potential amount and
the likelihood of a potential jury verdict in order to determine whether
filing the action is justified, and the defendant’s lawyer needs to assess
the client’s potential exposure in order to evaluate early settlement
options and in order to set a strategy and budget for case management
purposes.59
In recent years, such formal legal memoranda have been used less
frequently by lawyers, mainly due to the cost of preparing them. 60 As
clients have become more cost-conscious, lawyers have tried to become
more cost-efficient, relying less on formal memoranda and more on
shorter, informal memoranda, email memoranda, and oral research
reports.61 So while it may still make financial sense for a law firm to
have an associate prepare a traditional office memorandum in a highstakes matter, where cost-containment is not a pressing consideration, it
may not make sense in a more mundane litigation matter.
Still, regardless of the vehicle through which lawyers convey their
analyses, the element-focused analysis, based on legal research, has
formed the backbone of the traditional approach to outcome prediction
and remains an important predictive tool. It is still one of the principal
tools lawyers use to assess cases, particularly at the beginning of a
litigation matter.62 It is also one that can at least partially be delegated to
57. EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 4, 131; CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD &
WRITING 207, 210–11 (7th ed. 2014); DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 54, at 259.
58. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 5–15 (discussing the role of elementfocused analysis in the initial case-evaluation process).
59. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text.
60. See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, From Snail Mail to Email: The
Traditional Legal Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32, 32–
36 (2008) (describing survey results showing a reduced use of formal legal memoranda in
the practice of law).
61. Id. at 32–36, 41–42.
62. NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 40–45 (discussing the
steps involved in an element-focused analysis and describing it as the principal tool of
predictive writing).
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more junior lawyers, as it takes full advantage of the legal research,
writing, and analysis skills that law students develop in law school.63
B.

Lawyerly Experience

Another important resource that lawyers rely on when making
outcome predictions is lawyerly experience. Seasoned lawyers
instinctively temper the predictive analysis of an associate’s legal
memorandum with their own experience in assessing the likely outcome
of cases.64 An experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer, for example, may know
from past experience that plaintiffs’ verdicts for a cause of action such as
IIED are relatively uncommon, and the experienced lawyer will temper
accordingly the tendency of junior lawyers to skew the analysis in favor
of the client.65 Furthermore, the element-focused analysis contained in a
typical research memorandum often sheds more light on how likely an
action is to survive a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion,
rather than the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial. In the case of
IIED, for example, most of the reported cases are appeals from
dismissals for failure to state a cause of action or appeals from summary
judgment orders. Thus, they provide little guidance for how a jury is
likely to resolve a matter that survives a dispositive motion and proceeds
to trial.
An experienced lawyer may also consider other factors, besides the
doctrinal considerations that are analyzed in a traditional elementfocused analysis, in trying to predict the likely outcome of a litigation
matter. For example, an experienced lawyer may take into account the
background and perceived predilections of the individual judge(s)
involved in the case particularly if the lawyer has personal experiences to
63. For this reason, learning to draft memoranda is still one of the principal topics
taught in nearly all first-year legal writing classes, and it occupies an important place in
nearly all first-year legal writing textbooks. See, e.g., CALLEROS, supra note 57, at 189–
343; DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 54, at 259–91; EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 131–45;
NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159–67.
64. See CLARENCE MORRIS, HOW LAWYERS THINK 11–19 (2d prtg. 1938) (discussing
generally a lawyer’s reliance on intuition).
65. See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis:
Putting Law School Into Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1198 (discussing the
tendency of law students to “skew their research or analysis to reach the answer they
think the supervising attorney or the client wants”); Amanda Smith, Preparing for
Practice Beyond the Bench: Opinion Writing as the “Heart and Soul” of the First
Semester of Legal Writing, 18 J. LEG. WRITING INST. 263, 282 (2012) (arguing that most
inexperienced researchers skew the analysis in favor of the client).
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draw on with respect to these variables.66 The experienced lawyer may
also factor in non-doctrinal considerations such as the equities of the
lawsuit, the sympathetic or not-so-sympathetic nature of the parties, the
reputation of the opposing counsel, etc.67
In drawing upon experience to inform outcome prediction, the
lawyer is not necessarily confined to the lawyer’s own personal
experience. Rather, the lawyer may draw upon the opinion of more
seasoned lawyers (or expert consultants), in much the same way that a
physician may draw upon the experience of more seasoned physicians in
making a diagnosis.68 In either case, anecdotal evidence tempers the
purely legal emphasis of the element-focused analysis.
This anecdotal evidence thus enables the experienced lawyer to take
a more holistic approach to outcome prediction.69 The lawyer relies not
just on a legalistic examination of the constituent parts of a particular
cause of action, but also on a more “gestalt” view of the case (based on
the lawyer’s intuition) that takes into account a broader range of
potentially relevant considerations.70 Again, the parallel to medicine
presents itself. Just as an experienced physician may rely not only on a
checklist of symptoms in making a diagnosis but also on the physician’s
intuitive sense regarding the patient’s overall presentation, so too the
experienced lawyer may rely at least in part on whether the case “feels”
like a winner, drawing on the lawyer’s experience-based intuitions about
the strength of the case.71 This may well track (at least in part) the
manner in which judges and juries reach decisions.72 There is significant
66. See Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial
Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 509–14 (2002) (arguing that a judge’s
background traits, such as gender, education, and past work experience, are highly
predictive of case outcomes); Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342–43
(experiential knowledge supplements, and is sometimes more important than, the legal
rules for purposes of outcome prediction).
67. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406.
68. See Greene & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 31–32 (discussing research showing
that lawyers who consult with experienced colleagues regarding their outcome
predictions make more accurate predictions).
69. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Can Hunches Be Rational?, 4 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 155, 172 (2007).
70. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 106-111 (2008) (describing the role
of intuition and emotion in judicial decision making).
71. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1346 nn. 24–25 (discussing research
indicating that lawyers draw heavily upon their own experiences in making decisions).
72. POSNER, supra note 70, at 108 (“Thus, the more experienced the judge, the more
confidence he is apt to repose in his intuitive reactions . . . .”); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.,
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anecdotal and other evidence that judges and juries do not decide cases
merely by analyzing the individual elements and defenses; rather, they
balance that analysis against their intuitive sense of what justice demands
in an individual case.73 If so, then balancing the element-focused analysis
with the lawyer’s intuitive sense as to the likely outcome of a case, where
this intuition is ultimately derived from experience, would reasonably be
expected to improve the accuracy of the lawyer’s outcome prediction.74
C.

Empirical Information

The third principal tool that lawyers have traditionally used to
forecast case outcomes is empirical information about cases. While this
tool has not historically been as widely used as the first two tools
discussed above, empirical information is likely to become increasingly
important in this age of data analytics, as discussed in Part V.
The empirical information that has traditionally been used to guide
outcome predictions has been derived from several sources. The oldest
and most widely used source is the jury verdict reporter, which
summarizes jury verdicts by subject matter so that lawyers can see how
similar cases have been resolved in the past and can gain an
understanding of the expected verdict range in similar cases.75 Jury
verdict reporters are published in most jurisdictions. Jury verdict
reporters are published in most jurisdictions and are prepared by private
entities.76 The information in these reporters comes from publicly
available court records, as well as from the attorneys that were involved
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL
L. REV. 274, 284 (1929); see generally Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic
Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55 (2001) (discussing the
philosophical underpinnings of the “hunch” theory of judicial decision making).
73. See POSNER, supra note 70, at 110.
74. There is reason to believe that this type of reflective balancing between intuition
derived from experience, on the one hand, and more deliberate analytical processes, on
the other, is not confined to legal reasoning, but may instead be a fundamental feature of
human cognition. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 156 (“Simple heuristics
that ignore information can be better—faster, more frugal, and more accurate—than
complex strategies that use all available information.”). But see Davis, supra note 55, at
494–499 (describing some cognitive biases that may creep in when lawyers rely on
intuition to evaluate potential case outcomes).
75. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406.
76. Two of the largest commercial jury verdict reporters are VerdictSearch and the
National Association of State Jury Verdict Publishers. See VERDICTSEARCH,
www.verdictsearch.com (last visited July 30, 2018); NAT’L ASS’N STATE JURY VERDICT
PUBLISHERS, www.juryverdicts.com (last visited July 30, 2018).
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in the cases.77 Generally, the reporters organize the case summaries by
type of claim, type of injury, jurisdiction, amount, plaintiff’s
demographics, the insurer’s settlement history, etc. Originally, jury
verdict reporters were published in print in a newsletter format. Most of
them are now available online as well, and many of them provide access
to large online databases of case information that the lawyer can search
by category.78 Some of them offer research services as well, whereby a
staff researcher will search for cases in the database that are on par with
the case the lawyer is working on.79
The purpose of jury verdict reporters is to provide lawyers with
information about how cases that are similar to the cases they are
working on have been resolved. Lawyers can then use this information to
make reasonable predictions as to the range of expected jury verdicts in
similar cases.80 Thus, the emphasis is different from the element-focused
analysis discussed above in that jury verdict reporters provide guidance
as to what is likely to happen after a case makes it to trial. The traditional
element-focused analysis, by contrast, is geared more toward predicting
whether a case will make it to trial at all, as it focuses primarily on the
decisions of judges and not the actions of juries. Jury verdict reporters,
therefore, provide an additional outcome-prediction tool that lawyers can
use to assess both the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict and the potential
size of such a verdict in the event a case proceeds to trial.
Another source of empirical information that is more limited in
terms of its accessibility is confidential settlement data. Attorneys who
work with insurance companies, for example, have the benefit of the
insurer’s collected settlement and jury-verdict data from earlier cases the
insurer has litigated to help inform their outcome predictions. In one
respect, this information is narrower than that found in jury verdict
reporters, insofar as it is limited to the cases handled by that insurer
(although some insurers may elect to pool such information for their

77. See,
e.g.,
Online
Verdict
Search
Tool,
VERDICTSEARCH,
http://verdictsearch.com/online-verdict-search-tool/ (last visited July 30, 2018).
78. Online commercial research providers like Westlaw and Lexis also offer verdict
research tools. See, e.g., Westlaw Jury Verdicts, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS,
https://tmsnrt.rs/2AqwJKt (last visited July 30, 2018); LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement
Analyzer,
LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/verdict-andsettlement-analyzer.page (last visited July 30, 2018).
79. See, e.g., Custom Verdicts and Settlements Research on Call, VERDICTSEARCH,
http://verdictsearch.com/custom-research/ (last visited July 30, 2018).
80. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406.
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collective use). However, in other respects it is broader: for one thing,
the insurers are generally going to have more extensive information
about the facts, and for another, they have information concerning
settlements, in addition to verdicts. This gives the lawyer a more
comprehensive picture of possible case outcomes, as most cases settle
prior to trial.81 Jury verdict reporters, by contrast, are unable to obtain
information about most settlements, due to the confidentiality clauses
contained in most settlement agreements.82
The third source of empirical information that is used to inform
outcome predictions is jury research. Lawyers can hire jury-research
firms to consult with them on cases,83 and these firms provide lawyers
empirical information in two principal ways. First, they can provide
information about jury behavior generally, based upon their own
research. Second, they can empanel mock juries that sit through practice
trials and evaluate the dispute in question firsthand. This allows the
lawyers to try out different arguments and strategies and see how
effective they are with the mock jury, and it also provides them
information about how an actual jury is likely to resolve the dispute. 84
The information derived from a mock jury is of a different nature from
that obtained from either jury verdict reports or from compilations of
settlement data, insofar as the latter two sources focus on actual results
from past cases, whereas a mock jury verdict relies on a hypothetical
assessment of facts that are identical to the prospective case. The

81. See Kaster, supra note 26, at 43 & n.1.
82. Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (observing that
confidentiality agreements are frequently used to hide from public view the terms of
settlements and the underlying facts); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New
Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2007)
(“Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement . . . .”).
83. See generally Robert F. Ruckman et al., Focusing Your Case Through Jury
Research: Mock Trials and Other Tools, THE BRIEF, Spring 2017, at 58 (describing the
basic tools of jury research consultants).
84. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Mock Juries: Why Use Them?, LITIGATION, Winter
2009, at 32; Jerry W. Thomas, Mock Juries, DECISION ANALYST (1993),
https://www.decisionanalyst.com/media/downloads/MockJuries.pdf. For a good summary
of how mock juries are used and how the process proceeds, see Mary A. Bedikian &
Jerome D. Hill, The Ultimate Power of Persuasion: Using the Mock Trial to Enhance
Litigation Strategy, 72 MICH. B.J. 1046 (1993).
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drawback to jury research is that it is very expensive, and therefore it is
of limited availability to practitioners in many cases.85
The principal tools of case forecasting, then, are: (1) the traditional
element-focused analysis based on legal research, (2) the experience of
seasoned lawyers, and (3) empirical information about how similar cases
have been resolved in the past, compiled from jury verdict reporters, and,
in certain cases, from compilations of settlement data and jury research
information. The following section of this article examines how effective
these tools are in terms of predicting likely litigation outcomes, looking
with particular focus at the traditional element-focused analysis.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS
The tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case outcomes
have a number of limitations. As a result, outcome prediction—
notwithstanding its major importance to the practice of law—has always
been a rough science, its accuracy leaving much to be desired.86 This
section examines the limitations of the traditional tools of outcome
prediction, with a particular focus on the element-focused analysis.87

85. See generally Thomas, supra note 84, at 1. Some research information regarding
jury behavior in a generic sense is published in academic journals. See, e.g., Robert J.
MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989)
(offering an example of an early research piece on jury behavior). But generic
information of this type is not as valuable for purposes of outcome prediction as casespecific information.
86. See Kaster, supra note 26, at 44–45 (discussing research on the degree to which
attorneys value cases incorrectly, and assessing reasons for the shortcoming); GoodmanDelahanty et al., supra note 35, at 133.
87. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the traditional tools, clients continue to pay
handsomely for lawyerly advice, indicating at least a market belief that lawyers’
prognosticative skills have value. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 312 (1997). But then again, people pay
good money for tarot-card and palm readings as well, which probably says more about
many people’s strong desire to know the future than about the actual success of
traditional case forecasting. In theory, the accuracy of lawyer outcome predictions could
be tested. In fact, a recent study is enlightening as to the accuracy of the traditional tools.
See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the
United States: A General Approach 1 (July 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.6333.pdf (describing a forecasting model that correctly predicts
with approximately 70% accuracy the outcomes of Supreme Court decisions, which is
approximately the same success rate as expert Supreme Court watchers). Presumably, a
similar study could be undertaken of trial court outcomes, using focus groups to test the
accuracy of lawyers’ predictions. But currently no such data are publicly available.
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The Element-Focused Analysis

As a predictive tool, the traditional element-focused analysis
lawyers use to forecast case results has a number of shortcomings. This
is primarily because its accuracy depends upon an overly simplified view
of how legal analysis works. In order to accurately predict how a
prospective case will come out using the traditional element-focused
analysis, the lawyer making the prediction must be able to rely on the
consistent applicability of legal rules to known facts. In other words, it
must be the case that the rules can be clearly ascertained, that the facts
are known, and that relevantly similar factual contexts can be compared
so as to determine the applicability of the rules. And it must be the case
that the rules will be consistently applied in future cases, in the same way
they were in past cases.88
There are several inherent problems with this approach, however,
that hinder its reliability as a predictive tool. These include: (1)
uncertainty as to the precise facts that should be applied to the analysis;
(2) uncertainty as to the precise scope of the legal rules that should be
applied to the analysis; (3) the difficulty in assessing the legal
significance of certain facts; (4) the difficulty in accounting for nondoctrinal considerations that may affect the outcome of the case; (5)
limitations in the types of information that can be derived from published
opinions; and (6) the difficulty in making probability assessments in any
precise way using the element-focused analysis. Most of these problems
have been widely recognized—though not necessarily in the context of
outcome prediction. The final factor, however, has not received
significant attention in the scholarly literature and merits a more detailed
examination. The remainder of this section discusses each factor in turn.
1.

Factual Uncertainty

The first problem with the traditional element-focused analysis is
that it relies on accurate factual comparisons between the prospective
case and case precedents,89 and yet there is frequently uncertainty as to
the facts in a prospective (or even ongoing) case.90 This is particularly a
problem at the beginning of a case when the element-focused analysis is
88. Smith, supra note 42, at 15–16; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342.
89. See Smith, supra note 42, at 13–16.
90. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xii–xiii, xix (Peter Smith
Publishing 1970) (1930).
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often used to assess the viability of a particular cause of action. At this
stage of the proceeding, the lawyer must rely primarily upon the factual
account provided by the client, together with any additional information
the lawyer can glean from any documents provided by the client, and any
independent initial fact investigation the lawyer undertakes.91
The problem with relying on the client’s account alone, of course, is
that the client’s account may be biased; thus, the facts that ultimately
emerge at trial may not be in keeping with the story that the client
reported to the lawyer during the initial client interview.92 Furthermore,
the lawyer’s subsequent factual investigation, along with the discovery
process, may reveal surprises. Unanticipated documents may turn up, and
witnesses may provide somewhat different accounts of the facts than the
lawyer may have anticipated at the beginning of the case. Additionally,
the trial itself is often unpredictable. Witness credibility and likeability
are important factors in the jury’s assessment of the facts,93 and it is
difficult to work this information into an element-focused analysis, even
if credibility can be accurately assessed pre-trial. Also, the trier of fact
may not weigh the evidence the way the lawyer initially thought they
would, and the judge may exclude or limit the use of certain evidence at
trial that the lawyer was intending to rely on to build the case.94
Therefore, the difficulty of knowing in advance just how the finder
of fact will weave the evidence into a particular narrative makes the
application of the legal rules to the facts more difficult for the traditional
element-focused analysis than might be apparent at first blush.
2.

Legal Uncertainty

This difficulty is frequently compounded
legal rules. The traditional element-focused
predictions depends upon the ability of the
controlling legal rules and apply them to the

by uncertainty as to the
analysis used to assist
lawyer to ascertain the
facts of the prospective

91. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 89–90.
92. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, NINE PRINCIPLES OF LITIGATION AND LIFE 240 (2009)
(“The client may not level with you about the documents. The client may shade the
truth.”).
93. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–06.
94. See Smith, supra note 42, at 23 (“[T]he court may not draw the same inference
from the historical facts as you, your client, a witness, or the opposing party did.”).
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case.95 Yet it is often unclear what exactly the parameters of the rules are
and how exactly they apply to the prospective case.
For one thing, it is often difficult to synthesize a cogent legal rule
from disparate cases.96 The intellectual exercise of distilling a rule out of
multiple cases that promulgate somewhat different and nuanced rules is
not a determinative endeavor; rather, it is often possible to connect the
dots in more than one way (that is, to formulate a synthesizing rule in
different ways), and it is not always apparent in advance how a court will
do so.97
Furthermore, the legal rules themselves can be vague or ambiguous.
Hart’s well-known hypothetical about a statute prohibiting “vehicles” in
a park is a classic example of a vague textual rule; as Hart argued, it is
not at all obvious from the mere meanings of the words whether a
bicycle (or say a bicycle with a supplemental electric engine) is a
“vehicle.”98 Thus, there is often uncertainty as to how a court will
construe the “penumbra” around the core of a rule.99 Furthermore, legal
rules that are derived from cases, rather than textual sources, can be even
more vague and indeterminate.100 Such rules are generally highly
dependent upon the particular factual context in which they arise and are
subject to refinement and modification if the facts in subsequent cases
are significantly different.101
To be sure, comparisons of the facts of precedents to the facts of the
prospective case can often shed light on vague terms. For example, one

95. See id. at 10–23; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (discussing the link between clear legal rules and
predictability).
96. NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING,’ supra note 41, at 18–19. For a classic
legal-realist formulation of this argument, see FRANK, supra note 90, at 159–71 (arguing
that precedents are inherently indeterminate in terms of possible rule syntheses).
97. FRANK, supra note 90, at 163 (“Every lawyer of experience comes to know
(more or less unconsciously) that in the great majority of cases, the precedents are none
too good as bases of prediction.”).
98. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism & the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 606–15 (1958).
99. Id. at 607; see also DERNBACH, supra note 54, at 44.
100. This makes it easier for advocates, who can employ some creativity in
formulating the applicable rule, but it makes formulating a rule more challenging for
outcome prediction because the lawyer essentially has to make a prediction as to how the
reviewing court will formulate the rule. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra
note 41, at 93–96, 104.
101. See id. at 73–74 (discussing how there are sometimes gaps in the law due to a
lack of sufficient precedents on point).
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can compare and contrast cases that have granted summary judgment to
the defendant in IIED cases based upon the severity of the emotional
distress. If a certain level of emotional distress was deemed not to be
severe enough to satisfy the severity element in a particular precedent,
then the lawyer can conclude that a similar or lesser level of emotional
distress will not suffice in a prospective case. However, the precedents
may still leave significant room for doubt. Because the number of
precedents is frequently quite limited, there is often a significant gray
area remaining into which the facts of the prospective case may fall.
Legal rules as articulated by the courts are thus, by their nature, openended with respect to their potential applicability, and there frequently is
not enough precedent to provide meaningful guidance as to how they
will be applied in new circumstances.102
Finally, legal rules are not entirely static, and the governing
decisional law interpreting a rule may evolve during the course of the
case. What looked like a solid case at the beginning of a litigation matter
may look less certain if an ensuing legal precedent reshapes the
governing rule, and this too can affect outcome prediction.
Therefore, for these reasons, determining exactly what “the law” is
that should be applied to a given factual scenario is often less
straightforward than it might seem at first blush, further limiting the
effectiveness of the element-focused analysis as a predictive tool.
3.

The Difficulty in Assessing the Legal Significance of Certain
Facts

A related difficulty arises from the challenge of trying to ascertain
from reported court opinions exactly which facts are legally significant to
a particular holding. This too adds an element of uncertainty to the
element-focused analysis because it means that determining which
potential precedents are really on point can sometimes be difficult.103

102. Id. at 19 (“[O]nce a rule has been formulated, situations will inevitably crop up
that the rulemaking or did not anticipate her could not have been expected to
contemplate.”); see also Schauer, Precedent, supra note 46, at 576–79 (arguing that the
ability of precedents to constrain future decision-making depends upon the ability of the
decision-maker to determine that the legally relevant facts are similar).
103. See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 46, at 577–88 (discussing the factors that
determine which facts are legally relevant).
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Consider, as an example, the development of the tort of IIED in
Florida case law. In Slocum v. Fair Food Store of Florida Inc.,104 which
was the first appellate case to consider whether such a tort existed in
Florida, the Florida Supreme Court held that the tort, even if valid in
Florida, would not apply to the factual context in which the defendant
caused the emotional distress to the plaintiff merely by stating “you stink
to me.”105 However, in the next case to consider the tort, Korbin v.
Berlin,106 the Florida Court of Appeals found that a cause of action was
stated where the defendant told a six-year-old girl things like: “do you
know that your mother took a man away from his wife”; “do you know
that God is going to punish them”; and “do you know that a man is
sleeping in your mother’s room.”107 In Korbin, the court held that a cause
of action was stated because a reasonable jury could find that these
statements were “calculated to cause the child ‘severe emotional
distress.’”108 The court concluded that “[t]he alleged statements and the
manner and circumstances under which they were communicated
municated [sic] to the child leave little room to doubt they were made
with a purpose and intent to shame her, and to shock the sensibilities of
this child of tender years.”109 Additionally, the court noted that
“[r]elating, as they did, to the child’s mother, the content and import of
the statements” were sufficient to state a cause of action.110
From the Court of Appeal’s holding, it is apparent that the age of
the defendant (young Ms. Korbin was just six years old) was a legally
significant factor to be taken into account in future cases.111 In other
words, a lawyer interpreting Korbin would reasonably know from the
language of the court opinion that the bar for IIED is going to be
somewhat lower for outrageous verbal statements involving children than
it would be for adults. What is less clear, however, is what exactly the
court means when it refers to the “content and import” of the statements
as being a decisive factor.112 For example, should a lawyer comparing a
future case to Korbin on its facts also take into account the fact that the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
Id. at 398.
Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 552–53.
See id. at 553.
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defendant in Korbin alleged sexual impropriety on the part of the child’s
mother? Or is that fact immaterial? Would the holding in the Slocum case
perhaps have been different if, instead of telling the defendant “you stink
to me,” the defendant had impugned the plaintiff’s virtue, as in Korbin?
A reasonable argument could be made (by analogy to defamation law,
for example) that sexual accusations are more likely to be actionable than
accusations of body odor. However, it is not apparent from the court’s
holding in Korbin that this is so, and thus, it is not apparent that the
sexual nature of the statements is a legally significant fact that could be
applied to a new set of facts.113 In other words, the judicial opinion may
not reveal all of the factual considerations the judge actually relied upon
in reaching the decision.114
Thus, in addition to problems of factual and legal uncertainty, the
element-focused analysis is hindered by the challenge in certain cases of
determining precisely which facts have legal significance to a particular
holding.
4.

The Difficulty in Assessing the Significance of Non-Doctrinal
Considerations

A further uncertainty in the traditional element-focused analysis
stems from its difficulty in accounting for certain non-doctrinal
considerations that may affect an outcome prediction.
First, there are economic and psychological factors that can skew
the analysis by leading lawyers to take an overly optimistic view of the
client’s case. Most obviously, there is often an economic incentive to
favor the client’s position.115 Thus, plaintiff’s lawyers will have a
tendency to view the cause of action (and, of course, the lawyer’s own
113. See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (2006)
(describing how judges’ reliance on simplifying heuristics leads decision-makers to
“focus on facts that come readily to mind at the expense” of less apparent, but equally
important, background factors).
114. See Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Brüninghaus, Computer Models for Legal
Prediction, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 309, 315–16 (2006) (“Judges may not have disclosed the
features that influenced their decision or stated their rationales accurately or
completely.”); see also Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that insofar as “facts or
factors not shown in the [judge’s] report are at work . . . the opinion gives us a misleading
picture of what happened, and therefore, misleading basis for prophecy of what will
happen in the future”).
115. This is sometimes called “optimism bias.” See Katz, supra note 16, at 929; see
also Kaster, supra note 26, at 45; Oren Bar-Gill, The Origin and Persistence of Optimism
in Litigation, 22 OXFORD J. L. ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006).
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abilities)116 through rose-colored glasses. This is particularly problematic
in cases where the potential plaintiff will be paying an hourly fee; but
even in more traditional contingent-fee cases, it can still play a role.
Similarly, defense lawyers paid on an hourly basis have an obvious
economic incentive to prolong a litigation matter, even if an early
settlement might be in the client’s interests.
In addition, several other cognitive biases may skew a lawyer’s
predictions.117 For example, clients tend not to favor lawyers who are
pessimistic or perceived to be overly sympathetic to the opponent’s
position.118 Taken together, these factors create a tendency to
unrealistically assess the client’s prospects,119 which can lead lawyers to
reject as unreasonable settlement offers that may, in fact, be reasonable.
Theoretically, these psychological considerations could be taken into
account in tempering the conclusions of an element-focused analysis.
However, they are difficult to tease out and nearly impossible to
quantify.
The traditional element-focused analysis also fails to account for
certain non-doctrinal considerations that may influence the decisionmaker(s) (i.e., the court or the jury), and thereby affect the outcome of
the case. These include the types of considerations that legal realists
discussed at length a number of years ago, such as the personal biases of
the judge or jury.120 Judges and juries are not machines, and they cannot
be counted on to apply legal rules to the facts in a purely mechanical

116. See Green & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 31 (arguing that “lawyers may express
heightened confidence in their abilities in order to attract and maintain a clientele”).
117. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 841–54 (discussing various cognitive factors that
can distort predictions); see also Davis, supra note 55, at 495–98 (discussing different
cognitive biases that affect case evaluations).
118. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1347 n.27 (discussing research
indicating that lawyerly overconfidence may be a “necessary trait to attract and retain
clients”); see also Kaster, supra note 26, at 45 (“If the client communicates the
expectation of hearing only positive views, and the ability to go elsewhere if unsatisfied,
client think is even more likely.”).
119. See generally George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness
and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); see also Goodman-Delahunty et
al., supra note 35, at 139–43 (discussing research showing that lawyers are overly
optimistic in predicting trial outcomes).
120. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 90, at xii–xiii (discussing the hidden, unconscious
biases of trial judges that affect case outcomes). For a contemporary formulation of this
view, see POSNER, supra note 70, at 10–11 (discussing various personal attributes that
affect judicial decision-making).
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manner.121 Accordingly, the traditional-element analysis is hindered by
its inability to accurately account for factors such as the likability and
credibility of the parties that can affect the outcome.122 It also neglects
factors such as the reputation and success rate of the attorneys, the
historical tendencies of the individual judge(s) assigned to the case,
differences in the predilections of different courts (e.g., in different
localities), etc.123 Again, this is not an intractable problem for the
traditional element-focused analysis, since the traditional analysis can be
balanced against and adjusted for these non-doctrinal factors. However,
it is very difficult to weigh such factors, and this makes it difficult to
factor them into the traditional element-focused analysis.
5.

Limitations on the Amount and Type of Information Available
from Published Opinions

In addition to the issues discussed above, there is an inherent
limitation on the usefulness of the element-focused analysis due to the
nature of its source material: i.e., published judicial opinions. Since these
opinions (particularly those responding to pre-trial motions) focus their
attention primarily on the proper interpretations of the law, rather than
factual applications and determinations of damages, their usefulness is
primarily confined to determining whether a cause of action may exist,
rather than whether the plaintiff may succeed at trial and the amount of
potential recovery. In the IIED example discussed above, for instance,
most of the published opinions address motions for summary judgment
or to dismiss, and they are primarily concerned with whether the plaintiff
properly states a cause of action for IIED. One seminal Florida Supreme
Court case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McCarson,124
addresses an appeal from a jury verdict.125 But even that opinion is
primarily concerned with whether IIED is a recognized tort in the state of
121. POSNER, supra note 70, at 8 (“Empirical scholars have found that many judicial
decisions, by no means limited to the Supreme Court, are strongly influenced by a
judge’s political preferences, or by other extralegal factors. . . .”).
122. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–06.
123. See Leiter, supra note 87, at 312 (arguing that lawyers use informal
“psychological, political, and cultural knowledge” to help predict judicial outcomes).
Also see the discussion in Part V of this Article regarding Professor Schauer’s discussion
of outcome prediction based on non-doctrinal factors. See infra notes 187–93 and
accompanying text.
124. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985).
125. Id. at 278.
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Florida, and whether the plaintiff properly states a cause of action for
that tort.126 Thus, it provides only limited guidance as to what an IIED
plaintiff can expect to happen if the case proceeds to trial.
The upshot is that the element-focused analysis is primarily useful
as a tool for predicting whether the plaintiff’s claim will survive the
pretrial motion stage of the litigation and be allowed to proceed to trial.
Lawyers have to look to other predictive tools, e.g., jury verdict reporters
and settlement data, to formulate outcome predictions as to their clients’
chances of success at trial, and the amount of any potential recovery.
6.

The Difficulty in Making Probability Assessments in an
Element-Focused Analysis

Finally, there is one other problem that is intrinsic to the elementfocused analysis that has not received significant attention in the
scholarly literature. That is the difficulty of assigning probabilities to the
applicability of the individual elements in the traditional element-focused
analysis, and the difficulty in making an overall probability assessment
based upon these individual assessments.
As to the first issue, one of the primary tenets of the elementfocused analysis is that outcome prediction is facilitated by breaking
down a cause of action or defense into its constituent elements. In other
words, the traditional analysis assumes that the viability of the cause of
action or defense as a whole can best be determined by assessing the
viability of each individual element. The viability of each individual
element can, in turn, be assessed by looking at various IIED precedents
discussing that element, and an overall assessment of the cause of action
or defense will then flow from these individual assessments.127 For
example, a lawyer examining all the Florida precedents on the severity
element of IIED and applying them to a new factual scenario tries to
determine the likelihood that the court or jury in the present case would
find that the severity element was satisfied. Then, after doing the same
with respect to each of the other three IIED elements, the lawyer will be
in a good position to judge whether the cause of action as a whole will
succeed. Thus, the more contingent elements the plaintiff has to prove,

126.
127.

Id. at 278–79.
See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 5–7.
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the lower the likelihood, other things being equal, that the defendant will
prevail.128
For the reasons discussed in the preceding subsections, however,
determining whether an element is satisfied is often not something that
can be ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty. For example,
as discussed above, merely by looking at the various IIED precedents in
which the severity element was found to be applicable or not, the lawyer
cannot always assess the likelihood that the trier of fact will find the
severity element to be met in the prospective case. Determining the
likelihood that a particular court or jury will find a particular element to
be met is far from a precise science.129
But even assuming that lawyers can make reasonably accurate
probability assessments with respect to the individual elements in a cause
of action or defense, there remains a further obstacle: determining the
likelihood that the cause of action or defense as a whole is likely to
succeed, based upon the likelihood that the finder of fact will determine
that each individual element is met. This task raises some difficult
theoretical issues that seem, practically speaking, to be intractable.
To see why, consider again the IIED example discussed above. To
establish a cause of action for IIED, a plaintiff must convince the finder
of fact that each of the four required elements is met: (1) the action was
intentional; (2) the action caused emotional distress; (3) the emotional
distress was severe; and (4) the action giving rise to the distress was
“outrageous,” as that term has come to be defined through decisional
law.130 If the defendant succeeds in convincing the finder of fact that any
one of these elements is not met, then the defendant prevails. Now
assume that the plaintiff’s lawyer believes that there is an 80 percent
likelihood of persuading the finder of fact with respect to each of the four
elements. Is it likely that the action as a whole will succeed? And if so,
what is the probability?
At first blush, it may seem that the answer to the first question is
clearly “yes,” even if the answer to the second question is not obvious.
But in fact, even the answer to the first question is complicated. To
assess the likelihood that the cause of action for IIED will succeed, the
128. See David A. Moran, Jury Uncertainty, Elemental Independence and the
Conjunction Paradox: A Response to Allen and Jehl, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 950
(2003).
129. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at 149–50.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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starting point in a probability analysis would be to consider each separate
element as an independent variable, just as one would with a series of
coin tosses. For example, the probability of getting four “heads” in a row
flipping a coin is only 1/16, even though the probability of getting
“heads” with respect to each individual toss is 1/2. In other words, the
basic rule in determining the probability that a series of (independent)
events will occur is determined by multiplying the odds that each
individual event will occur.131 Accordingly, in the IIED example given
above, the starting point for determining the probability that the action as
a whole will succeed is determined by multiplying the likelihood that
each individual element will be satisfied. Thus, for this calculation, the
probability that the trier of fact will find all four elements to be met is 0.8
× 0.8 × 0.8 × 0.8 = 0.41 or 41%, which means that the plaintiff is actually
more likely to lose than win.
It is tempting to conclude from this that there is a tendency for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to make overly optimistic outcome predictions, since
what at first blush looked intuitively likely—that the cause of action as a
whole would probably succeed—is in fact unlikely.132 However, even
that conclusion is questionable because it is based upon an assumption,
as noted above, that the individual variables (i.e., the elements of the tort)
are independent of each other, when often there is probably some degree
of interdependence between them, due to the holistic nature of judicial
decision-making.133 In other words, the factors that influence the court’s
131. See IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 41–
43 (2001).
132. This is related to an evidentiary quandary that has sometimes been referred to as
the “conjunction problem” or the “conjunction fallacy.” See Saul Levmore, Conjunction
and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 724 (2001).
133. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946. Furthermore, there is a counter-veiling factor
at work when a plaintiff brings multiple claims for recovery. The plaintiff in a civil
matter can (and often does), allege more than one cause of action in a lawsuit. See
MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 61–64 (discussing the pros and cons of asserting
multiple claims). Suppose, for example, that the IIED claim is one of only three causes of
action the plaintiff has alleged in an action, and suppose further that each cause of action
is determined to have a 41% chance of success. Then the odds that the plaintiff will fail
on each count is accordingly 59% (1 – 0.41), and thus the odds that plaintiff will fail on
all three counts is, per the multiplication rule discussed above, 0.59 × 0.59 × 0.59, which
comes out to a probability of 0.205, or 20.5%. See HACKING, supra note 131, at 42
(discussing the multiplication rule of probability). Similarly, the odds that the plaintiff
will succeed on at least one of its three causes of action alleged is accordingly 0.795, or
79.5% (1 – 0.205). Id. Therefore, even though plaintiff is likely to fail on each of the
three causes of action considered independently, it follows from the multiplication rule of
probability that the plaintiff is quite likely (almost 80%) to succeed on at least one of the
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resolution of one element may well affect its assessment of the other
elements too.134 However, multiplying the individual probabilities of the
variables in a series to determine the probability that the series as a
whole will occur is appropriate only where the variables are independent,
i.e., where the resolution of each variable has no effect of the resolution
of the other variables.135 For example, the probability of getting four
“heads” in a row in a series of coin tosses is determined by multiplying
the odds of each individual coin toss (1/2 or 50%) because no one coin
toss affects any other coin toss.136 However, where one event may affect
the likelihood that another will occur, a simple multiplication of the
individual probabilities will not prove accurate, and a more complicated
calculation is necessary.137
Suppose, for example, that two evenly matched teams are in a
World Series. Prior to the first game, statisticians would reasonably
assign a 50% likelihood that a given team would win with respect to each
individual game. If Team A wins the first three games, it is reasonable to
assume that the odds of Team A winning the fourth game will be deemed
higher than 50%, in order to take into account factors such as momentum
and demoralization of the opponent. But how much higher would the
odds be? The answer to that question cannot be determined purely
mathematically, though empirical data about how prior teams performed
when down 3-0 in a World Series could shed some light on it.
Bringing this back to the traditional element-focused analysis, there
is reason to believe that the individual variables in the element focused
analysis (i.e., the likelihood that the trier of fact will find each element to
be satisfied) are similarly interdependent. In other words, the trier of
facts’ resolution of one element may well affect the resolution of one or
more other elements.138 As discussed above in Section III.B, there is
reason to think that experienced lawyers tend to analyze cases in a more
holistic way, rather than merely parsing the likelihood that each element

plaintiff’s causes of action. Again, however, this calculation assumes the independence of
each individual cause of action, which is probably not accurate for the same reason the
individual elements are often not independent. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946.
134. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946.
135. See HACKING, supra note 131, at 42.
136. JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO TRANSFORM
INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT 81 (2014).
137. See id. at 80–82 (discussing conditional probabilities and Bayes’ Rule).
138. See Moran, supra note 128, at 950–52.
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of the cause of action will be satisfied.139 So too there is evidence that
judges and juries decide cases in a more holistic way, and that they
balance a more intuitive view as to which party should prevail in a case
with a strict analysis of the separate elements.140 If so, then the trier of
fact’s resolution of one element would tend to affect the trier of fact’s
assessment of the other elements, and this interdependence would have
to be factored into the outcome prediction, just as it would in the World
Series example discussed above.
However, whereas statisticians can in that example determine (with
some modicum of accuracy) the degree of interdependence of the
variables by looking at past World Series results,141 no such general data
is currently available with respect to judicial decision-making. Thus, it
will not be possible, practically speaking, for a lawyer to assess with
accuracy the likelihood that a cause of action will succeed, even if it
were possible to assign probabilities to each individual element. For
while it can safely be assumed that the odds of success are higher than
merely multiplying out the individual probabilities of the elements would
lead us to believe (due to the likely interdependence of the elements),142
there is no publicly available information as to how much higher. Thus,
one of the fundamental axioms of the element-focused analysis is
inherently flawed.
B.

Limitations on the Other Traditional Tools of Outcome Prediction

The previous section discussed a variety of problems afflicting the
traditional element-focused analysis that lawyers use to make outcome
predictions. Fortunately, this is not the only predictive tool available to
lawyers. Rather, as discussed above in Part III, lawyers, particularly
139. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 171–72.
140. See POSNER, supra note 70, at 107–09; see also supra notes 65–66 and
accompanying text.
141. For example, statistical records may show that historically only one team in
twenty-five (4%) that was down three games to none has ever won a World Series,
whereas the odds that an evenly matched team would win four straight is normally 6.3%
(1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/16 or 0.0625), which would provide some evidence of the
momentum effect. The sample set is so small, however, that one could not rely with any
degree of confidence on the empirical data. See generally HACKING, supra note 16, at
229–45 (discussing issues with statistical inferences based on small or unrepresentative
samples). If, for example, a team overcame a 3–0 deficit the following year and won the
World Series, the odds would change significantly based on the then-cumulative data—
from 1/25 or 4%, to 2/26 or 7.6%—leading to the opposite conclusion.
142. See Moran, supra note 128, at 950–52.
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seasoned lawyers, also rely heavily on experience—their own and that of
other lawyers—in assessing potential outcomes, and they also have
available to them certain empirical resources, such as jury verdict
reporters, jury research, and, in some cases, settlement data. However,
while these additional tools provide useful supplements to the traditional
element-focused analysis, they are not without their own significant
limitations.
1.

Lawyerly Experience

The first supplemental tool available to lawyers in making outcome
predictions is lawyerly experience—their own, as well as that of other
lawyers they consult. For seasoned lawyers, in particular, personal
experience is a very valuable tool, just as it is for seasoned physicians in
making diagnoses and in predicting the course of various diseases. As
discussed above in Section III.B, experience enables a lawyer to broaden
the scope of the analysis, bringing in non-doctrinal considerations such
as the lawyer’s knowledge of a particular judge’s propensities, or the
tendencies of juries in particular localities to favor plaintiffs or
defendants in certain types of cases.143 Furthermore, experience enables
lawyers to take a more holistic approach to outcome prediction,
evaluating the big picture by relying on intuitions about likely outcomes
that are honed from past cases.144
While experience is undoubtedly a valuable tool in the lawyer’s
arsenal, it is certainly not without its limitations.145 For one thing,
experience is obviously developed over time, so more junior lawyers will
be quite limited in this respect. However, even for more seasoned
lawyers, information derived from experience tends to be
impressionistic, as it relies upon the accuracy of the lawyer’s memory,
and is a filtered interpretation of past events that may be influenced by
the lawyer’s own beliefs and biases about the law, and about people and
institutions.146 Additionally, personal experience is, by its nature,
143. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
144. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 171–72. For a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of this reliance on lawyerly intuition, see Davis, supra note
55, at 494–99.
145. In fact, one study indicates that lawyers’ accuracy in predicting outcomes is not
significantly enhanced by experience. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at
133.
146. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1340 n.12 (citing research
indicating that lawyers “operate with beliefs and biases that can cloud their judgment”);

OSBECK- FINAL EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LAWYER AS SOOTHSAYER

12/10/2018 4:54 PM

79

limited.147 Even in fields such as securities trading, while a broker’s
experience with how other clients have fared with respect to certain types
of investments is certainly valuable, it is not a substitute for actual
experimental data on stock performance that transcends the broker’s
personal experience.148 And in law, personal experience is even more
limited because lawyers have less to go on, given the relatively few
clients most of them have as compared to, say, stock-brokers and
physicians.
Furthermore, lawyerly experience as a predictive tool is subject to
several of the same problems that afflict the element-focused analysis.
Experience does not provide an end-around to the challenges of factual
uncertainty and legal uncertainty. Lawyers are still reliant on limited
sources of information, such as the client’s account of facts, when
initially assessing a case.149 Likewise, the lawyer’s past cases will never
be entirely on par factually with a prospective matter, so how a court will
apply a vague legal rule to a new legal situation remains subject to
doubt.150 Furthermore, the lawyer will not easily be able to get around the
problem of identifying exactly which facts are legally significant,
because a lawyer generally has only limited information about what facts
really influenced the court or jury’s decision.151
Thus, while experience is certainly a helpful guide to the lawyer, it
is not by itself a particularly accurate source of outcome prediction in
individual cases.
2.

Empirical Information

The other principal predictive tool discussed in Part III was
empirical information available to the lawyer, in particular, jury verdict

see also Kaster, supra note 26, at 44–45 (discussing the factors that can cloud a lawyer’s
judgment); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 897–
901 (2006) (discussing distortions that arise in judicial decision-making due to judges’
reliance on simplifying heuristics that are based in part on cognitive biases).
147. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 849.
148. As a result, medical advice is heavily dependent on experimental data. This is
true in a number of other fields as well, such as the stock brokerage industry. See
Katz,supra note 16, at 948–49 (discussing the increasing reliance on data-driven
decision-making in the stock-brokerage industry).
149. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 89–90.
150. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
151. See FRANK, supra note 90, at 119–24.
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reporters, jury research, and, in certain cases, settlement data. While
these too are helpful tools, they too have some significant limitations.
With respect to jury verdict reporters, they are limited in terms of
the types of information they provide (and also, to some extent, in terms
of their reliability, given that some of the information comes from the
lawyers involved in the case). Often, for example, they provide only
cursory factual summaries, which exacerbates the problems created by
factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty.152 As discussed in Section IV.A
above, it is difficult to compare cases on their facts when factual
information about the prospective case is of limited reliability (due to
factual uncertainty), and the information about the precedent case is very
limited in scope.153 Furthermore, since the factual information available
in jury verdict reporters is not generally presented in a very detailed
manner, the ability of lawyers to draw generalizations about specific jury
findings is limited.
As discussed in Section III.C above, some lawyers are able to draw
upon case-specific jury research tools to supplement jury verdict
reporters.154 These have the advantage of providing very detailed and
case-specific information about a prospective case and its likely
outcome, and they also allow lawyers to experiment with different
adversarial approaches.155 However, jury research tools are also limited
insofar as they do not address whether a cause of action is likely to
survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment; rather, they only shed
light on the likely outcome in the event of a trial. In that respect, jury
research tools suffer from a limitation that is the reverse of the limitation
discussed above with respect to the element-focused analysis.156 In
addition, mock trials are one-sided as to the nature of the evidence, in
that they do not allow the mock jury to hear the other side’s actual
case.157 Mock trials are also limited insofar as they tend to be shorter than
actual trials, relying on truncated evidentiary presentations.158

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
See Johnson, supra note 84, at 32–33.
See supra Section IV.A.5.
DAVID TABAK, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, SETTLEMENT REASONABLENESS
FROM
NEGOTIATION
TO
SETTLEMENT
DISPUTES
4
(2012),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Settlement_Reasonab
leness_0212.pdf.
158. Id.
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Furthermore, as discussed in Part III, mock trials are very expensive, and
thus they are generally limited to only high-dollar cases.159 Even testing a
case on a single mock jury or focus group requires a substantial
expenditure, and to ensure greater accuracy, it would be necessary to try
the prospective case to multiple mock juries, to eliminate possible
idiosyncrasies of a single panel. However, the costs associated with
doing that narrows the usefulness of mock juries as a predictive tool to a
very small subset of cases.
Finally, as discussed in Section III.C above, settlement data can be
used to assist lawyers in making outcome predictions. Such data is often
valuable in assessing a potential client’s exposure or expected recovery,
particularly since the great majority of cases ultimately settle prior to
trial. To be sure, settlement data will not provide direct information
about the prospects for a case’s surviving a dispositive motion, such as a
summary judgment motion, nor will it provide direct information about
the expected outcome at trial. Still, it is a valuable predictive tool that
certain lawyers rely on heavily in assessing cases.160 Relying on past
cases, for example, an insurance defense lawyer can make a reasonably
accurate assessment of the settlement value of a case and can make
appropriate settlement decisions accordingly.
The main drawback to the use of settlement data as a predictive tool
(as in the case with jury research) is that it is not readily available to
most lawyers, since only certain clients, such as insurance companies and
large corporations, face repeated litigation and are thus in a position to
acquire large quantities of useful settlement data. Additionally, since the
majority of settlements are confidential and not available to the public,161
most lawyers have no way of tapping into this pool of information.
In sum, empirical information serves as a valuable predictive tool
for lawyers, but its value is limited insofar as much of the most useful
information is unavailable to the majority of lawyers who make outcome
predictions.
V.

USING DATA SCIENCE TO IMPROVE OUTCOME PREDICTION

Part IV of this article discussed the principal reasons why lawyers
struggle with outcome prediction, using the traditional tools available to

159.
160.
161.

See Thomas, supra note 84, at 1.
See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying test.
See supra note 82.
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them. While those tools certainly have some predictive value, they are
also subject to significant shortcomings and limitations that hamper their
ability to provide helpful guidance to their clients concerning potential or
pending legal matters. In the past few years, however, a potentially
powerful new tool has received significant attention: the prospect of
using data science to help lawyers make better outcome predictions. This
part of the article discusses the potential for data science to provide
lawyers with an additional tool to improve their outcome predictions.
A.

Data Science and Prediction

“Data science” and “data analytics” are fairly vague terms,
encompassing a number of different techniques analysts use to drive
information from large sets of data. As one prominent analyst defines it,
“[d]ata science is the transformation of data using mathematics and
statistics into valuable insights, decisions, and products.”162 Data science
includes traditional analytics techniques such as optimization,
forecasting, and simulation, along with more recent innovations such as
data mining, artificial intelligence clustering, machine-learning, and
detection of outliers.163
The use of such tools to make predictions is often referred to as
“predictive analytics” or “outcome analysis.”164 Predictive analytics has
been successfully employed in a variety of contexts. In the realm of
politics, for example, analysts such as Nate Silver have used predictive
analytics with some degree of success to anticipate election results.165 In
the area of medicine, predictive analytics has shown promise in
predicting disease outbreaks, helping physicians diagnose diseases, and
in advancing genomics research.166 In the area of sports, predictive
162. FOREMAN, supra note 136, at xiv.
163. Id. Foreman’s book provides a good overview of these various predictive
techniques and how they work. See id. at chs. 4–7.
164. See generally ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT
WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 103–220 (2013) (providing a general overview of
predictive analytics and its uses).
165. See generally NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL & THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY
PREDICTIONS FAIL BUT SOME DON’T xiii–xvii (Penguin paperback ed. 2015).
166. See Dan Meisler, Projects use Big Data to predict diseases, advance genomics
analysis,
THE
UNIVERSITY
RECORD
(Jan.
24,
2017),
https://record.umich.edu/articles/projects-use-big-data-predict-diseases-advancegenomics-analysis; see also W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116
MICH. L. REV. 421, 425–31 (2017) (discussing the use of computer-generated medical
algorithms to assist physicians in making medical diagnoses).
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analytics has been used for gambling purposes to predict the outcome of
games and tournaments, as well as by teams to predict (e.g., for purposes
of determining how much to spend on a free-agent, or which rookie to
draft) the likelihood that a player’s career will continue its current
trajectory or improve.167 In the field of meteorology, predictive analytics
has been used to improve weather forecasts.168 And in the business
world, predictive analytics has been successfully used for a variety of
purposes. Most notably, it is used for marketing and advertising purposes
to identify consumers in a targeted manner who might be most likely to
purchase particular products.169 However, there are a host of other
business uses for predictive analytics,170 ranging from consumer fraud
detection, to evaluating consumer debt risks, to helping dating services
find promising matches, to enabling autonomous cars to operate, to
automatically customizing music “stations” for individual listeners,171
and so on.
The success of predictive analytics over the past decade or so is
largely due to advances in the field of artificial intelligence, which have
enabled predictive analytics to make more accurate predictions than the
traditional forecasting models that were used to facilitate predictions in
earlier years. The traditional forecasting models required the researcher

167. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 74–107.
168. Id. at 108–41.
169. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 38–40. Siegel discusses a certain retail chain that
wanted to target a marketing campaign to those among its existing customers who are
pregnant (e.g., in order to send them ads for baby related products). Id. at 38. Under
traditional methods of statistical analysis, marketers would first have to specify variables
that the marketers believed to have predictive import, focusing for example, on women
within a certain age range, who had purchased items such as pregnancy tests and diapers
within the past several months. Id. at 39. But by using artificially intelligent predictive
analytics, the retailer was able to identify previously unknown variables within a sample
set of customers known to be pregnant (because they had signed up on a baby register),
thereby improving the store’s ability to predict which customers were pregnant, and
allowing it to target its marketing campaign more efficiently. Id.
170. Id. at 54–59, 116–18; see also Spyros Markridakis, Forecasting the Impact of
Artificial Intelligence Part 3 of 4: The Potential Effects of AI on Businesses,
Manufacturing, and Commerce, FORESIGHT: THE INT’L. J. OF APPLIED FORECASTING,
Spring 2018, at 18. Another important use of predictive analytics is business forecasting,
whereby analytics are now used to predict such things as a company’s future revenues or
growth. See generally MICHAEL GILLILAND, LEN TASHMAN & UDO SGLAVO, BUSINESS
FORECASTING: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (2016) (containing a collection of
leading articles on business forecasting).
171. For a graphical overview of these different business uses, see SIEGEL, supra note
164, at 142 (Tables 1–9).
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to specify the variables that the researcher believed to be significant for
purposes of prediction.172 In law, for example, a lawyer may think that
the court and particular judge involved, the location of the trial, the
particular lawyers representing the parties, and, of course, the nature of
the cause(s) of action involved are the most important predictive
variables. The lawyer can then focus on those variables when comparing
the facts of precedent cases to the facts of a prospective case. The more
sophisticated tools that employ artificial intelligence advance the analysis
further by using algorithms to identify their own predictive variables.173
Thus, instead of relying just on a researcher’s intuition as to what factors
have predictive import, some artificially intelligent tools are capable of
identifying patterns and automatically isolating predictive variables that
the researcher may not have considered. The tools do this by
automatically identifying patterns in training sets of data, and then
creating predictive models based upon these patterns.174 In addition,
some of the newer tools differ from the earlier, more basic analytics tools
in that they employ machine-learning techniques, which means that they
are able to learn from their mistakes, and thereby continue to hone over
time the accuracy of their predictions.175 If a particular variable turns out
to be a less promising predictor than originally hypothesized, a
sophisticated predictive-analytics model will automatically adjust the
weighting it gives that variable going forward to improve the accuracy of
the model.176
Perhaps the most high-profile example in recent years of using
artificial intelligence to drive more accurate predictions has been the
development of applications based upon IBM’s Watson platform.177 To
demonstrate the capability of Watson, IBM first used it to develop an
artificially intelligent Jeopardy contestant, equipping the computer with
memory capable of accessing millions of documents very quickly, and
then training it with appropriate sample sets to predict the correct

172. See id. at 26–27.
173. Id. See generally Lyra Bennett Moss & Janet Chen, Using Big Data for Legal
and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 643 (2014)
(providing an overview of the process by which artificial intelligence uses algorithms to
identify predictive variables).
174. SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 111–15.
175. Id. at 110.
176. Id. at 122–23.
177. See Katz, supra note 16, at 925–26.
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answers to Jeopardy questions.178 At first, Watson was unable to beat a
group of Jeopardy champions. However, because it had machine-learning
capability, Watson was able to improve its performance as time went on
to the point where it was able to beat these champions regularly.179
Subsequently, IBM has used the Watson platform to enable such tools as
an artificially intelligent chess player180 and an artificially intelligent
chef,181 both of which are able to compete well with masters of their
respective crafts. Also, predictive analytics tools are now being used in
fields like medicine as well, where, among other things, they can help
predict disease patterns and aid doctors in making diagnoses.182
As discussed in the following sections, applications based on the
Watson platform are also now being used, along with other predictiveanalytics tools, to assist the practice of law.
B.

Data Science in the Practice of Law

In the practice of law, data science has been assuming an
increasingly important role over the past few years. This began in the
area of e-discovery, where data science has enabled law firms and
corporate legal departments to conduct discovery investigations in a
significantly more cost efficient and timely manner, using techniques
such as auto classification and predictive coding.183 But data science
techniques have also been used increasingly for other practice related
purposes as well, such as: case management, billing, and budgeting;
records management and other types of information governance;
contracts review and management; selection of outside counsel; and,
most pertinent to this article, outcome prediction.184 In addition, legal

178. See id. at 925–28 (providing a summary of how the Watson platform works).
179. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 151–52, 178–84.
180. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 265–89 (describing the development of IBM’s
artificially intelligent chess player that is based on the Watson platform, and the
machine’s ultimate victory over the reigning world champion, Gary Kasparov, in 1997).
181. See Alexandra Kleeman, Cooking with Chef Watson, IBM’s Artificial
Intelligence
App,
NEW
YORKER
(Nov.
28,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/cooking-with-chef-watson-ibmsartificial-intelligence-app.
182. See, e.g., Meisler, supra note 166.
183. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1348 (discussing the enormous growth
of e-discovery over the past decade).
184. Katz, supra note 16, at 928–49 (discussing in detail some of the legal practice
use of predictive analytics); Warren A. Agin, A Simple Guide to Machine Learning,
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research services have employed some important data-science advances
to improve the responsiveness of their searches.185
The legal profession’s demand for data analytics services appears to
be growing quickly. For the past several years, an organization called
The Coalition of Technology Resources for Lawyers (CTRL) has
published an annual survey of the use of data analytics among corporate
legal departments in the United States. In the 2015–2016 survey, 93% of
practitioners reported that they thought data analytics will become more
important and more widespread in the legal profession in the coming ten
years, including 31% who predicted that data analytics would be “very
important,” considered “indispensable,” and its use “widespread” within
the next ten years.186 One year later, the 2016–2017 survey revealed that
99% of practitioners now thought that data analytics will be very
important, considered indispensable, and its use widespread within the
next decade.187 According to the survey, the principal purposes for which
corporate legal departments use data analytics at the present time are for
(1) e-discovery (including document culling, early case assessment, and
fact-finding), followed by (2) case management (including management
of outside counsel, comparing projected spending to actual spending,
resource allocation, and budgeting), (3) review and analysis of
contracts,188 and (4) information governance (including facilitating
defensible disposition, facilitating compliance with records policies and
BUSINESS
LAW
TODAY
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2017/02/07_agin.html.
185. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Bloomberg Law Launches AI Research Tool to Find
Key
Points
of
Law,
LAWSITES
BLOG
(Sept.
26,
2017),
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2017/09/bloomberg-law-launches-ai-research-tool-findkey-points-law.html; see also Ashley & Brüninghaus, supra note 114, at 310–333
(discussing the use of artificial intelligence in current research platforms and the
possibilities for further use).
186. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, DATA ANALYTICS IN
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: 2015–2016 TRENDS 3–6 (2015), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/CTRL-Survey-Data-Analytics-in-the-Legal-Community-20152016.pdf.
187. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, DATA ANALYTICS IN
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: 2016–2017 TRENDS 2–5 (2017), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/2017-CTRL-Report-R2.pdf [hereinafter CTRL, 2016–2017
TRENDS].
188. Both Microsoft and Cisco recently announced that they are instigating pilot
projects to develop and test artificially intelligent software that will help law firms
manage their contracts. See Rhys Dishpan, Microsoft and Cisco Test the Waters with AI
Contract Management Pilot Programs, LEGALTECH NEWS (May 15, 2017, 2:38 PM),
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202786204660/.
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other requirements, and facilitating data migration).189 Beyond these
uses, some smaller ventures have been exploring other possible uses for
predictive analytics in the practice of law. For example, predictive
analytics can be used to assist lawyers in the jury selection process. 190
Additionally, in the area of criminal law, predictive analytics now offers
researchers a powerful new tool to assess the potential for recidivism
among defendants as a routine part of sentencing decisions.191
Data science, therefore, will undoubtedly play an increasingly
important role in the practice of law in future years.192 And while
outcome prediction has not thus far been at the forefront of data science
applications in the law, that appears to be changing. CTRL’s 2018
Survey revealed a 43% increase from 2017 in law-firm use of data
science for purposes of outcome analysis, and a 175% increase (from
16% to 44% percent of the surveyed firms) in anticipated spending for
purposes of outcome analysis in the coming year.193
The following section looks at how lawyers are likely to incorporate
these predictive analytics tools into their arsenal of traditional predictive
tools to facilitate more accurate outcome predictions, and it discusses
some challenges predictive analytics will have to overcome for it to be a
true game changer.
C.

The Prospects for Using Predictive Analytics to Improve Outcome
Predictions

An increasing number of legal commentators have begun to look at
predictive analytics as a potentially powerful new tool in the area of
outcome prediction.194 In fact, there is good reason to believe that
189. See CTRL, 2016–2017 TRENDS, supra note 187, at 1–5.
190. See Leslie A. Gordon, Big Data Juries, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2016, at 16. For an
overview of other law-practice applications of predictive analytics, see Katz, supra note
16, at 929–36.
191. See Richard Berk, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing
Decision, 27 FED. SENT’G R. 222 (2015).
192. Katz, supra note 16, at 963–64.
193. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, 2018 ANALYTICS
REPORT 4–5 (2018), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2018-CTRLIGI-Analytics-Report-Final.pdf.
194. See Katz, supra note 16, at 948–49; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 3
(“[B]y leveraging the quantitative strength of computers, lawyers can accurately forecast
how events are likely to play out in the litigation.”); Josh Blackman, The Path of Big
Data and the Law, in BIG DATA AND THE LAW (West Academic Press 2014); Snyder,
supra note 33, at 854–66.
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predictive analytics may well drive some significant changes in the way
lawyers assess potential case outcomes in their day-to-day practices.
Thus, in the not-too-distant future, we can expect to see lawyers relying
heavily on predictive analytics to complement the traditional tools of
prediction, such as the element-focused analysis.
This Section looks at the current state of predictive analytics in the
legal profession, and it assesses the potential going forward for
predictive analytics to supplant, or more plausibly, complement, the
traditional tools of outcome prediction discussed above in Part III. First,
Section V.C.1 looks at the historical development of predictive analytics
as a tool for making outcome predictions. Next, Section V.C.2 looks at
the current state of predictive analytics as a tool for assessing outcome
predictions in the practice of law. Finally, Section V.C.3 examines some
key challenges predictive analytics will have to overcome going forward
if it is to have a significant effect on the way lawyers make outcome
predictions.
1.

The Development of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for
Outcome Prediction

Fundamentally, predictive analytics is an extension of the use of
empirical information, which is one of the traditional tools of outcome
prediction.195 Like that traditional tool, it helps lawyers predict case
outcomes by comparing information about past cases with a prospective
case. Underlying both tools is an assumption (grounded in the concept of
stare decisis) that similar cases are likely to be decided similarly.196 In
contrast, whereas the use of jury verdict reporters and settlement data
rely on the lawyer’s subjective assessment of similarity, predictive
analytics employs computer algorithms to detect objective patterns in the
language of court opinions and other court documents that can then be
compared to the prospective case.197
For more than half a century now, researchers have been exploring
the potential use of such computational analyses to predict the outcome
of legal cases. Most of the early efforts, however, were made in cognate
fields, such as political science and artificial intelligence.198 And for the
195. See supra Section III.C.
196. See Smith, supra note 42, at 15–16, 55.
197. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 16–18.
198. See, e.g., Loevinger, supra note 10; Kort, supra note 10; Schubert, supra note
10; Fisher, supra note 10.
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most part, these initiatives were not disseminated within the legal
academy. However, in 1964, a young political science professor named
Stuart Nagel published an article in the Texas Law Review entitled
Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction.199 This article
expanded on an article Nagel had written four years earlier, entitled
Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, which was
published in The American Behavioral Scientist.200 In these articles,
Nagel used reapportionment cases to demonstrate how “correlation
analysis” can be used to identify patterns in cases where the party
attacking apportionment is successful. Nagel then described the process
for conducting this analysis as follows:
This process can be partially mechanized by converting the full text of
the relevant cases into punched tape either by a typist or an optical
scanner. Which side won in each case as well as the full text should be
punched on the tape. The punch tape can then be processed by a
program computer to read out each word (including its grammatical
variations and synonyms) that has a +20 correlation or more (at a given
level of probability) with victory for a given side (e.g., the
apportionment attacker). If too few or too many predictive words are
read out, the specified correlational probability levels can be raised or
lowered accordingly. The resulting list of predictive words should
generate insights as to what some of the relevant predictive variables
are.201

Nagel thus set out over 50 years ago, in in a rudimentary form, the
basic strategy for using predictive analytics to identify patterns in the
language of case law that can be used to predict case outcomes.
Over the next several decades, data scientists, political scientists,
and researchers in the area of artificial intelligence continued to work on
refining techniques for using computational analyses to predict case
outcomes (particularly Supreme Court decisions), with limited

199. Stuart Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction, 42 TEX. L. REV.
1006 (1964) [hereinafter Nagel, Correlation Analysis].
200. Stuart Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Dec. 1960, at 24. The most recent formulation of Nagel’s theory can
be found in his book, COMPUTER-AIDED JUDICIAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTING, PRESCRIBING,
AND ADMINISTERING (1992).
201. Nagel, Correlation Analysis, supra note 199, at 1009.
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success.202 But the efforts never really generated much interest among
legal academics until personal computers started becoming ubiquitous in
the practice of law during the 1990s.
In 1998, Professor Frederick Schauer wrote an article entitled
Prediction and Particularity203 that laid an important theoretical
foundation for predictive analytics. In that article, Schauer discussed the
role of a legal doctrine in enabling outcome predictions, by contrasting
the views of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Carl Llewellyn. Under
Holmes’s view, Schauer argued, a lawyer predicts case outcomes by
evaluating how courts resolved precedents by reference to traditional
legal concepts such as “contract,” “consideration,” “waiver,” among
others. In so doing, the lawyer determines precisely how courts apply
these legal concepts and compares their applicability to a prospective
case in order to predict how the prospective case will likely be
resolved.204 Llewellyn, on the other hand, put a greater emphasis on nondoctrinal factors in analyzing the likely outcome of cases. As Professor
Schauer described Llewellyn’s view:
Llewellyn did not deny that there were regularities in the law. Nor did
he deny those regularities might facilitate the process of predicting
future legal outcomes. He did, however, deny that those regularities
were regularly captured by the generalizations typically referred to as
“legal doctrine,” and thus claimed that legal doctrine did not reflect
empirical regularities, and that legal regularities reflected by
categorizations that did not resemble traditional legal doctrine. 205

Thus, for example, in analyzing injunctions decided by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals from 1920 to 1954, Holmes would look to
traditional rules such as “a party who delays claiming its rights to the
detrimental reliance of another party is precluded from obtaining an
injunction” in order to predict the likely outcome of a prospective case.206
Llewellyn, on the other hand, would rely on a non-doctrinal principle

202. See generally T.W. Rutger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision-making, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
203. Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998)
[hereinafter Schauer, Prediction and Particularity].
204. Id. at 781.
205. Id. at 782.
206. Id. at 783.
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such as “the coal company wins” to predict the outcome of future
cases.207
Professor Schauer went on to note that, while legal scholars had
largely ignored Llewellyn’s call to focus on extralegal considerations in
making outcome predictions, social scientists had been quite active in
this regard.208 He cited as an example a large body of political science
scholarship that has analyzed Supreme Court decisions with respect to
extra-legal variables that enable outcome predictions.209 Schauer
concluded that while there is slim evidence for the view that traditional
doctrinal analysis enables accurate outcome predictions, “there is great
empirical support for what [social scientists] call the ‘attitudinal model,’
the view that the best predictors of Supreme Court decisions are the
policy attitudes or preferences of the justices, and that, often, the best
predictors of those are the party affiliations of the presidents who
appointed them.”210 Schauer’s analysis is important, therefore, because it
emphasizes the importance, for purposes of outcome prediction, of
looking for meaningful patterns among precedents that go beyond the
traditional doctrinal concepts the courts purport to rely on in those
precedents, which is a task for which predictive analytics is well
suited.211 For even if such factors are deemed to be inappropriate for
some purposes, such as legal explanations and arguments, their
predictive value for purposes of outcome prediction should not be
disregarded.
2.

The Current Status of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for
Outcome Prediction

Over the past several years, legal scholars have begun to take an
increasing interest in the topic of prediction in the law, particularly the
prospects for using data science to enable more accurate outcome
predictions. Among the more prominent voices in the field at present
207. See id. at 783–84.
208. Id. at 784–85.
209. Id. at 784 n.31; see also Katz, supra note 16, at 936–39 (discussing social
science research beginning in the 1980s that focuses on using non-doctrinal
considerations to inform outcome prediction in the context of Supreme Court cases);
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1352 n.62 (summarizing research on data-driven
attempts to predict Supreme Court decisions).
210. See Schauer, Prediction and Particularity supra note 203, at 784–85.
211. See Bennett & Chen, supra note 173, at 647–650 (describing how predictive
analytics goes beyond traditional legal concepts in employing predictive variables).
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time is Professor Daniel Katz, whose important paper, Quantitative
Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,212
provides a summary of the current uses of data analytics in the practice
of law, including outcome prediction. With respect to outcome
prediction, the piece examines the early efforts to employ machine
learning to enable outcome predictions, particularly in the fields of patent
law and securities fraud class actions. Katz stresses the preliminary
nature of these efforts and argues that predictive analytics will soon be
employed widely to assist lawyers in making outcome predictions.213 He
concludes that “the age of quantitative legal predictions is about a
mixture of humans or machines working together to outperform either
working in isolation.”214
The study of predictive analytics to assess potential case outcomes
has also led to the development of products that can be used to aid
outcome prediction. The principal commercial online research services
began offering tools for evaluating potential case outcomes several years
ago. These tools essentially aggregated data from jury verdict reports and
related publications, allowing users to filter results by category such as
type of case, lawyer, judge, and location to find comparable cases.
LexisNexis, for example, introduced a product called Verdict &
Settlement Analyzer,215 and Westlaw introduced a product called Case
Evaluator.216 Both provide information about verdicts (and some
settlements) for particular causes of action in various jurisdictions,
showing averages and ranges of recovery for a variety of different types
of cases. They break the information down by jurisdiction and court, by
party (plaintiff versus defendant), by subject matter, and by amount of
verdict, and they provide case summaries, along with trial and appellate
documents that were filed in the actions. These tools have brought a
greater degree of precision to the process of comparing and analyzing
212. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – Or – How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,
62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013).
213. Id. at 936–942.
214. Id. at 929.
215. See
LexisNexis
Verdict
&
Settlement
Analyzer,
LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/verdict-and-settlement-analyzer.page
(last
visited July 30, 2018).
216. See Westlaw Case Evaluator, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS,
https://tmsnrt.rs/2LQzDN8 (last visited July 30, 2018).
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past cases that are similar (per various metrics that the user can specify)
to the case in question. Instead of just perusing summaries of cases in
jury verdict reporters and looking for similarities to the case in question,
the lawyer can rely on data automatically compiled from such cases by
the search engine.217
In addition, somewhat more sophisticated tools that incorporate
artificial intelligence and machine-learning techniques have been
introduced in recent years by smaller commercial ventures (mostly
incubated by universities) to assist lawyers in evaluating cases. The
pioneer in this area of predictive analytics has been a company called
Lex Machina, which is now owned by LexisNexis.218 Based in Silicon
Valley, Lex Machina began as a public interest project at Stanford
University, and was a spin-off from the law school and the Computer
Science Department.219 The company focused on two areas of law: patent
litigation (its original focus) and securities litigation, though it now
provides some analytic services with respect to other types of cases as
well, such as antitrust, employment, and products liability cases.220 The
company uses predictive analytics tools to provide insights on opposing
lawyers, law firms, parties, judges, venues, and other information, and it
offers individualized early case assessment.221 On the patent litigation
side, it has compiled a huge database of information from the Electronic
Document Information System of the United States International Trade
Commission, as well as from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, including documents from trials before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board. It then supplements this information with trial-court
documents from the federal government’s PACER service.222 On the

217. Some jury verdict reporters now offer these tools as well, as noted above. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
218. See Casey Sullivan, LexisNexis Acquires Lex Machina, BIG LAW BUSINESS (Nov.
23, 2015), https://bit.ly/2KyJBSB.
219. See About Lex Machina, LEX MACHINA, https://bit.ly/2IEPSXT (last visited Aug.
1, 2018).
220. See About LexisNexis, LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2MGtgc2 (last visited Aug. 1,
2018).
221. See Legal Analytics Platform, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/legalanalytics/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); Legal Analytics Apps, LEX MACHINA,
https://lexmachina.com/legal-analytics-apps/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
222. See How It Works, LEX MACHINA, https://bit.ly/2yYNPOJ (last visited Aug. 1,
2018).

OSBECK- FINAL EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

94

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

12/10/2018 4:54 PM

[Vol. 123:1

securities side, the company analyzes data regarding damages from
reports of SEC penalties, discouragements, and approved settlements.223
With respect to outcome prediction, Lex Machina’s Case Resolution
Analytics tool tracks different variables and case outcomes to enable
more accurate predictions. Other tools provide information on trends in
holdings among judges and courts, evaluations of opposing counsel
parties, information on a party’s litigation history, and damages
analytics. A fairly new product is the company’s Motion Kickstarter tool,
which assists lawyers in drafting motions by identifying which
arguments and motion styles are likely to be the most successful in a
certain type of case, taking into account the particular court or judge.
While Lex Machina was the first significant venture to make
predictive analytics available to lawyers, it has now been joined by
several other significant ventures. These include Bloomberg Law, which
introduced its Litigation Analytics tool in 2016,224 Judicial Perspectives
(which is owned by ALM),225 Premonition (which is based on IBM’s
Watson platform and focuses on lawyer selection analytics),226 and Ravel
Law.227 Of these, Ravel Law appears to be making the biggest splash.
Ravel Law, like Lex Machina, is a 2012 spinoff from Stanford
University’s law, computer science, and “d.school” departments.228 Also
like Lex Machina, Ravel Law is now owned by LexisNexis and available
as part of Lexis’s subscription package.229 The program is best known for
its innovative legal research platform, which uses visualization tools to
223. Another venture that provides analytics services in the area of securities
litigation is NERA Economic Consulting. See NERA, http://www.nera.com (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018).
224. See Litigation Analytics, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://bit.ly/2KkXjsO (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018); see also Robert Ambrogi, Bloomberg Law’s New Litigation Analytics
Peeks Under the Robes of Judicial Data, LAWSITES BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2MCTMTl (discussing how Bloomberg Law’s Litigation Analytics tool
“aims to help attorneys gain insights into questions such as how long federal judges
typically take to resolve cases, how they rule on dispositive motions, and how often they
are overturned on appeal.”).
225. See Legal Solutions to Build a Better Case, ALM INTELLIGENCE,
https://bit.ly/2yXmtsr (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
226. See Legal Analytics, PREMONITION, https://bit.ly/2z0jMX0 (last visited Aug. 1,
2018).
227. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last visited Aug.
1, 2018).
228. See Who We Are, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/who-we-are/ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018).
229. See Stephen Rynkiewicz, LexisNexis Acquires Case Analytics Firm Ravel Law,
A.B.A. J. DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://bit.ly/2KwvWvc.
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show users at a glance the complex relationships between the various
precedents interpreting a particular rule.230 But Ravel Law has also
moved in the past two years into the business of predictive analytics. Its
Court Analytics and Judge Analytics tools analyze for a particular judge
or court, or by jurisdiction, case outcomes, language patterns, and
citation history to provide insight on past rulings and to shed light on
anticipated future case outcomes.231 The tools are thus valuable both for
outcome predictions, as well for crafting persuasive arguments. In
addition, Ravel Law has introduced a tool called Firm Analytics that
tracks, for various legal specialties, the success rates and volume of work
of various large law firms in order to assist consumers of legal services
in choosing the best firm for a particular job.232 LexisNexis is currently
in the process of rolling many of these tools into its Lexis Advance
platform.233
Another venture that has drawn significant attention is ROSS
Intelligence. Incubated at the University of Toronto, ROSS Intelligence
is now located in Silicon Valley.234 The company is primarily associated
with legal research; it is based on IBM’s Watson platform and relies
upon artificial intelligence and machine learning tools. 235 ROSS
Intelligence touts its product as the “world’s first digital lawyer” because
it allows lawyers using it to ask natural language questions, to which it
provides answers by predicting the most applicable solution to the
problem posed by the question.236 Earlier this year, ROSS also
230. Ravel Law has also drawn significant attention for its Case Law Access Project,
which has digitized and provided open access to all the case law in the Harvard Law
School library. See Case Law Access Project, LIBRARY INNOVATION LAB,
https://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-project/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
231. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last visited Aug.
1, 2018).
232. See Daniel Lewis, Introducing Firm Analytics, RAVEL LAW (May 23, 2017),
http://ravellaw.com/introducing-firm-analytics/.
233. See Robert Ambrogi, Exclusive First Look: Ravel Law’s Integration with Lexis
Advance, LAWSITES BLOG (Feb. 2, 2018), https://bit.ly/2z0m4FB.
234. See AL Interview: Andrew Arruda, CEO and Co-Founder, ROSS Intelligence,
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER (Oct. 12, 2016), https://bit.ly/2ILJttQ.
235. See id. Westlaw has recently introduced a similar tool, called Westlaw Answers,
as has LexisNexis, which recently introduced Lexis Answers. Both provide ordinary
language answers to common legal inquiries. See Westlaw Recent Enhancements,
THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS, https://tmsnrt.rs/2z2FMR8 (last visited Aug. 1,
2018); You Ask. Lexis Answers—new machine-learning feature on Lexis Advance,
LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2v7co7C (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
236. See
ROSS
Intelligence:
Overview,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/company/ross-inc/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); see also KEVIN
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introduced a free product called EVA that analyzes drafts of legal briefs
to ensure that the citations are still good law and to locate additional
cases with similar language to those in the brief.237 While ROSS
currently does not provide a tool for making outcome predictions (given
that it is not equipped to handle questions such as, “[w]hat is the
likelihood that my client wins this case, given the following facts?”), it
does not seem far-fetched to think that the product could eventually be
enabled to make such predictions.238
In sum, while the available predictive-analytics technology is not
yet at a state where it can enable accurate outcome predictions over a
broad variety of case types, the landscape is evolving quickly, and it
would seem reasonable, based upon the trajectory of growth in the field,
to envision that these tools will be widely used by practitioners to
supplement the traditional tools of outcome prediction in the not-toodistant future. For this vision to be realized, however, data scientists will
need to overcome the obstacles discussed in Section V.C.3 below.
3.

Potential Limitations on the Use of Predictive Analytics as a
Tool for Outcome Prediction

While the future of predictive analytics in the legal profession looks
bright, it is important to keep in mind some of the potential limitations on
its ability to improve outcome predictions. While the technological
advances hold significant potential, it is easy to get caught up in the
enthusiasm and lose track of their limitations. As Nate Silver emphasized
in his book on predictive analytics, The Signal and the Noise—Why So
Many Predictions Fail, But Some Don’t, “[I]f science and technology are
the heroes of this book, there is risk in the age of Big Data about
becoming too starry-eyed about what they might accomplish.”239 So
while predictive analytics has some advantages over the traditional tools
of outcome prediction, particularly the element-focused analysis
discussed in Parts III and IV, it is premature to say that it will replace

D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS 14–18 (explaining
generally how Watson works).
237. See Robert Ambrogi, ROSS Unveils EVA, a Free AI Tool to Analyze Briefs,
Check Cites and Find Similar Cases, LAWSITES BLOG (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2EmP1L2.
238. But see ASHLEY, supra note 236, at 18–31 (discussing the challenges Watson
faces in terms of its ability to engage in “legal reasoning” and solve legal problems).
239. SILVER, supra note 165, at 447.
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these traditional tools in the near future; rather, predictive analytics can
be expected to complement the traditional tools of outcome prediction.
On the plus side, predictive analytics is not subject to some of the
problems with the traditional tools discussed in Part IV above. The
difficulty in assessing probabilities that afflict the element-focused
analysis, for example, is not an issue because predictive analytics does
not rely on an analysis of independent variables,240 relying instead on the
detection of subtle correlations to enable predictions. Likewise,
predictive analytics is better able to account for extra-legal
considerations than the traditional tools because it can look for patterns
among the holdings of individual judges, courts, and party types based
on factors the courts may not have enunciated in the opinions (e.g., it can
quantify the percentage of time the coal company actually does win in
injunction cases).241 And the data set on which the analysis is based
could be significantly broader than the limited collection of precedents a
lawyer uses in an element-focused analysis because predictive analytics
could take into account trial documents and other information about a
case beyond mere published opinions.242 Nevertheless, as discussed
further below, the availability of meaningful data is not as
comprehensive as one would hope.
According to Nate Silver, a lack of meaningful data is one of the
two principal factors that limits the success of predictive analytics
generally.243 The other is the difficulty in separating what he calls the
“noise” from the “signal.” As Silver put it:
The goal of any predictive model is to capture as much signal as
possible and as little noise as possible. Striking the right balance is not
always so easy, and our ability to do so will be dictated by the strength
of the theory and the quality and quantity of the data. 244

240. See supra notes 132–142 and accompanying text.
241. See Ashley & Brüninghaus, supra note 114, at 317–318 (discussing research
showing that predictive analytics can make accurate predictions based on rules that do
not correspond to patterns of reasoning that are familiar to lawyers).
242. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1354–1368 (discussing sources of
potentially useful data); see also Kevin W. Clement & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125–126 (2002) (“On the one hand, judicial decisions
represent only the very tip of the mass of grievances. . . . On the other hand, published
decisions are a skewed sample of that tip . . . .”) (emphasis added).
243. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 80.
244. Id. at 388.
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This difficulty in teasing out the signal from the noise is the central
metaphor that runs throughout Silver’s book. What he seems to be
referring to is the unique feature of predictive analytics that is both a
strength and a weakness. Because it does not try to tease out causal
factors for purposes of explanation, but merely looks to find predictive
patterns, predictive analytics is able to identify a broader array of
meaningful (for purposes of prediction but not necessarily explanation)
correlations than traditional scientific methods.245
To use a simple example, predictive analytics may reveal that
persons living in a certain geographic area tend to be afflicted with lung
cancer at a higher rate than average. But this correlation does not show
that living in the locale is itself the cause of lung cancer—it may just be
that persons living in that locality smoke at a higher rate than average.
But for purposes of prediction (e.g., for healthcare planning purposes),
that distinction doesn’t really matter.
This strength, however, can also be a weakness. Because it does not
deal in the realm of causation, predictive analytics is subject to
identifying accidental correlations that are not meaningful and do not
inform predictions.246 The key challenge for predictive analytics is thus
to find ways to eliminate statistical anomalies (i.e., randomness) that do
not enable accurate predictions, and in fact, impede them. As Silver put
it:
It would be nice if we could just plug data into a statistical model,
crunch the numbers, and take for granted that it was a good
representation of the real world. Under some conditions, especially in a
data-rich fields like baseball, that assumption is fairly close to being

245. SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 90 (“When applying PA, we usually don’t know
about causation, and we often don’t necessarily care. For many PA projects, the objective
is more to predict than it is to understand the world and figure out what makes it tick.”);
see also Katz, supra note 16, at 952. Of course, the use of predictive analytics is not
limited to finding these types of “black box” correlations. Predictive analytics can also be
used to help lawyers craft effective arguments by identifying legal arguments, phrases, or
cases that have proven to be particularly persuasive, either in general, or with respect to a
particular judge. Ravel Law, for example, touts its Court Analytics and Judge Analytics
tools for this purpose. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last
visited Aug. 1, 2018).
246. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 121 (“For any predictive model a pressing
question persists: Has it learned something true that holds in general, or only discovered
patterns that hold within this data set?”).
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correct. In many other cases, a failure to think carefully about causality
will lead us up blind alleys.247

Thus, predictive analytics is still a work in progress, and significant work
remains to be done to improve its ability to distinguish meaningful (i.e.,
predictive) patterns from non-meaningful patterns.248
Furthermore, the use of predictive analytics to inform outcome
predictions in the law also suffers from the other significant challenge
that Silver referenced (i.e., a lack of quality data). The world of judicial
decision-making is not the world of baseball, where “pretty much
everything that has happened on a major-league playing field in the past
140 years has been dutifully and accurately recorded, and hundreds of
players play in the big leagues every year.”249 Rather, as discussed above
in Section IV.A, there are some significant limitations on the types of
information available with respect to the actual bases for judge and jury
decisions. This is perhaps particularly apparent with respect to settlement
information, where the lack of widely available data concerning
confidential settlements poses a significant challenge for lawyers using
predictive analytics to inform outcome predictions. The problem is that
most litigation matters are resolved through settlement, and most of the
litigation matters that are resolved through settlement rely on
confidentiality clauses to limit public access to the terms of the
settlement.250 But unless data analytics companies can tap into such
information, their predictions will not be highly accurate, given the
limited data sets that they are able to draw from with respect to case
outcomes. To be sure, there are some types of litigation where settlement
data is more widely available, such as securities class-action litigation, in
which many settlements require court approval, and are therefore in the
public domain. Thus, it is not surprising that companies like Lex
Machina have so far focused on specialty areas, such as securities
litigation and intellectual property litigation. However, this is the
exception, not the rule; for most litigation matters, information about

247. SILVER, supra note 165, at 372.
248. For a detailed discussion of the various techniques AI researchers have
employed in their effort to improve outcome predictions, see ASHLEY, supra note 236, at
107–126.
249. SILVER, supra note 165, at 80.
250. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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settlement amounts remains largely outside the reach of lawyers not
privy to the case.251
Of course, much of this data is out there; the challenge is to make it
readily available to lawyers for purposes of outcome prediction.
Currently, insurance companies and other corporations that are involved
in frequent litigation compile settlement data for their own use, and this
gives them a significant advantage in predicting how litigation matters
are likely to be resolved. But most lawyers do not have access to this
type of information, and they are thus left to draw primarily on the
traditional outcome prediction tools discussed in Parts III and IV above.
If, going forward, insurers and other companies with large quantities of
settlement data would agree to pool such data and make it publicly
available (perhaps for a fee), that would go a long way toward enabling
predictive analytics to provide reasonable assessments of litigation
prospects in prospective cases. However, there is no indication at present
to think that such companies plan to do so.252
A further limitation on the quality of data that predictive analytics
relies on is its generic nature, which makes it difficult to track individual
factual distinctions between cases. Just evaluating the data from
published opinions does not provide a lot of information about the facts
that may have weighed on a court’s decision in a precedent beyond what
the court specifically identifies as legally relevant.253 Without reference
to the entire factual record in a case, predictive analytics will be limited
in its ability to find meaningful factual similarities between past cases
and a prospective case, thus limiting its predictive potential. To be sure,
including pleadings and other trial documents that contain factual
information in the data set can help significantly in this respect, which is
presumably why a company such as Lex Machina includes trial-level
251. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
252. An argument can be made that insurers and other companies with large amounts
of compiled settlement data would be doing everyone a favor, including themselves, were
they to make their settlement information more widely available. As discussed in the
previous section, there is a tendency for lawyers to overestimate the likelihood of their
being successful in a given action that can skew accurate outcome predictions. If these
lawyers were privy to more actual data about the types of cases they were involved in,
they might be able to temper their expectations, which would lead to earlier and more
efficient settlements. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1374–1377 (discussing
research that indicates parties are more likely to settle if each side has better information
about its opponent’s case).
253. For a helpful overview of the prospects for using predictive analytics to assess
legal relevance, see Katz, supra note 16, at 954–57.
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documents (such as those available on the PACER database) in its
analysis.254 But even with such trial documents, factual information is
limited because some of the documents that would be the most data-rich,
such as deposition transcripts, are generally not publicly available. This
lack of factual information is particularly acute with respect to nondoctrinal considerations that may affect the outcome of a case. The
likability and credibility of the individual parties, for example, are widely
recognized as factors affecting the outcome of trials.255 Yet this not the
kind of information that generally gets compiled in court documents,
particularly with respect to jury trials.
In sum, the use of data analytics to predict legal outcomes is not
likely to be a cure-all for the problems associated with the traditional
predictive tools. But it may well provide a useful supplemental tool in
the not-too-distant future to augment the type of predictive analysis
undertaken in the traditional legal memorandum. And as Professor Katz
argues,256 predictive analytics tools used in conjunction with the
traditional predictive tools will likely outperform either type of tool used
individually.
VI. CONCLUSION
Outcome prediction has always been a vital part of practicing law.
Clients of all types rely on their attorneys to provide accurate
assessments of the potential legal consequences the clients face when
making important decisions. And yet, notwithstanding its enormous
importance to the practice of law, outcome prediction in the law remains
a very imprecise endeavor. The three traditional tools lawyers rely on
when making predictions, the element-focused analysis, lawyerly
experience, and empirical information, are all subject to significant
limitations that hinder their effectiveness as predictive tools.
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science are enabling
new predictive tools that look to be potential game-changers. Already,
these advances are bringing about significant changes in the way lawyers
practice law, and they hold significant promise for outcome prediction as
well. Thus, it seems quite likely that predictive analytics, while not a
254. For helpful discussion of PACER as a source of litigation data at the trial level,
see Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1357–1364.
255. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–406.
256. Katz, supra note 16, at 929 (“The equation is simple: Humans + Machines ˃
Humans or Machines.”).
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panacea that can replace the traditional tools of outcome prediction in the
foreseeable future, will increasingly emerge as an important
supplemental tool that should help to make outcome predictions more
accurate. And that is very good news for the clients who rely on the
predictions.

